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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the development of Wahhabism as an
ideology into a rapidly expanding, transportable,
contemporary Islamic political system. Serving as the
territorial foundation, individuals maintain allegiance to
Makkah, the center of the Islamic world, through symbolic
Islamic prayer. Along with a central, globally financed
economic distributive mechanism, and Wahhabi social and
educational institutions emerging from the traditional
mosque, Wahhabism serves the demand for an Islamic
political system in a late capitalist world.
Wahhabism is fluid within contemporary dynamic
political systems and rapidly changing international
relations.

Wahhabism continues to expand at a global

level, at times, providing a foundation for new forms of
contemporary terrorism.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

This study will examine the development of Wahhabism
from an ideology to a political system.

Wahhabism is a

term derived from a man named Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab
ibn Suleiman ibn Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Rashid al
Tamimi, born in 1703 AD, north of Riyadh in the small town
of Uyayna, in the Arabian Peninsula (Wahhabism Exposed
Sheikh Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 2004). The term
Wahhabism is generally used to indicate radical Islamic
movements or Islamic fundamentalism (Dallal, 1993).
However, this study aims to demonstrate that although
Wahhabism is a potent religious ideology, it is also a
political system based on the ideology, and founded by
Saudi Arabia’s ruling family, the al-Sa’ud, and their
political strategist, Abd al-Wahhab.
It is critical to demonstrate the difference between
Wahhabism as an ideology and as a political system.
Ideologies play a part in the development and operation of
political systems and the ideological infrastructure
influences a political system’s institutions and techniques
(Loewenstein, 1953). Within the dynamics of sociopolitical
2

power, Wahhabi ideology is the motive force and the
subsequent political system’s techniques and institutions
are the mechanics or apparatus by which Wahhabism as an
ideology transforms and reproduces itself into real
political and social action. Wahhabi ideology provides the
substructure for the institutionalized existence of
Wahhabism as a political system. In much the same way,
Wahhabism as an ideology creates and uses institutions and
techniques commensurate to its ideological premises, in
order to realize sociopolitical action. For the purpose of
this study, Loewenstein’s major premise applies, in that
Wahhabism’s underlying political ideology conditions the
function and shapes the operation of the Wahhabi political
system comprised of political institutions and techniques
(Loewenstein).
Wahhabi ideology was an effective tool utilized to
unite and control the masses in Saudi Arabia (Blanchard,
2005). Wahhabi ideology is elevated into the realm of
mystical by denial of study and thorough comprehension of
its foundations, empowering itself through lack of
scholarly research, even of its perpetrators and
perpetuators. Western and non-Islamic misrepresentation of
3

Wahhabism, through lack of knowledge of its foundation and
structure, breeds prejudice from those who do not
understand and contempt (demonstrated in the form of
contemporary terrorism) from its followers worldwide.
Wahhabi political systems represent a comprehensive
set of institutions-economic, government, and educational,
and the relations between those institutions, accompanied
by the rules and norms that govern their function.

Wahhabi

ideology evolved into a political system with key
components based on Islamic and tribal economic,
authoritative, and social practices and beliefs, providing
the ruling authority, the al-Sa’ud, with a monopoly on the
legitimate use of force and legislation.

The study of

Wahhabism as a political system demonstrates the historical
significance of tribal groups in exercising political
authority, alongside Islamic jurists and clergy.
Recent terrorist attacks against the United States,
its interests overseas and those of its allies, including
the bombing of the twin towers in New York, bombings in
Europe, the explosions at the expatriate compound in
Riyadh, and the beheading of foreign nationals and American
citizens Johnson and Berg, necessitate a better
4

understanding of Wahhabism as both an ideology and a
political system. Although many scholars are quick to
employ the term Wahhabi in examining contemporary religious
terrorism, there is a need for scholarly work that
addresses the foundations and the real meaning behind the
discourse.
This study aims to demonstrate that Wahhabism is an
ideology that has developed into a political system.
Before examining the life of the founder of Wahhabism, it
is important to point out the historical precedence of
Islamic territoriality in the Arab world.
Saudi Arabia is host to the two most sacred Islamic
shrines in the world – the Kaaba (a house constructed in
primitive days to worship one God) at Makkah and the mosque
and tomb of the ‘seal of the prophets,’ Mohammed ibn Abd
Allah (born 570 A.D.), at Medinah (Rupert, 2005). One of
the mandatory five pillars of Islam (the five most
fundamental aspects of Sunni Islam) is the pilgrimage or
hajj to Makkah, Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia serves as the
leading Sunni Moslem Islamic authority; its populations
represent models of Islamic conduct and practices for
Moslems around the world. Therefore, being the birthplace
5

of the founder of Islam as well as host to the two most
sacred Islamic sites, Saudi Arabia is considered the
spiritual leader of the Islamic world (Metz, 1993).
In the absence of a clear method of succession in the
desert Kingdom, the al-Sa’ud have utilized the Wahhabi
political system over the decades in order to maintain
power over the increasingly vital, oil laden region of the
world. Today, Wahhabi activists struggle to control Saudi
Arabia, while the al-Sa’ud family, the proclaimed guardians
of the Islamic world, maintain power over one of the
largest petroleum reserves in the world, while also
controlling the majority of the buying power in the Middle
East.
This study will demonstrate that Wahhabism emerged in
the Arabian Desert as an ideology and subsequently, was
developed into a political system by the al-Sa’ud with the
guidance and assistance of a political strategist named Abd
al-Wahhab. Al-Wahhab’s ideas, along with al-Sa’ud political
ambitions, served to consolidate and strengthen political
power and control over the vast, fragmented Arabian
Peninsula and its tribes. That Wahhabi system, modified and
adjusted throughout the decades by a tightening and
6

loosening of religious, economic, and political controls,
allowed the al-Sa’ud tribal family to attain political
power over all of the tribes of Arabia, consolidating them
into what is known as present day Saudi Arabia.
For the past decade, Wahhabism has been predominantly
classified in the news and academia as a form of radical
Islam. Authors including Fuad Ajami, along with a multitude
of rhetoricians, expound on Wahhabism in contemporary
literature with little or no exposure to the Wahhabi-based
system. Daniel Pipes, a published Middle East and Islamic
analyst, calls Wahhabism a death cult in conflict with the
rest of Islam, although Wahhabism does not advocate death,
and most mainstream Moslems are not familiar with Wahhabism
as a particular cult of Islam (Pipes, 2004) (Kaplan, 2004).
The dearth of scholarly research on Wahhabism creates a
vacuum whereby analysts form unsubstantiated conclusions,
often leading to greater conflict through the
misrepresentation of Islam to the world.
In this study I will deconstruct Wahhabism and examine
its foundations and the historical contexts within which it
evolved, together with the meaning of the term Wahhabism;

7

utilized to imply a variety of predominantly religious
connotations within differing contexts.
The fluidity of its definition has led to a
misunderstanding of the Wahhabi phenomenon. While the term
Wahhabism can be used to symbolize a radical Islamic
movement, it is in that particular context that we may lose
the real significance of Wahhabism as a rapidly expanding
political movement, rendering those threatened by it less
capable of dealing with the potentially dangerous
ramifications.
Labeling Wahhabism a religion or a component of the
Islamic religion has also increased the movement’s ability
to recruit members into its dangerous and seemingly
contagious war that aligns East against West and Islam
against the infidels that are exemplified by Americans and
American culture (Ambah, 2004). Disenfranchised and
marginalized populations are attracted to Wahhabism as an
answer to global problems.
Wahhabism can expand very rapidly under these
conditions, resulting in the propagation of a more hostile
religion-based ideological political system. Therefore, not
only is the meaning of Wahhabism fluid within contemporary
8

dynamic political systems and rapidly changing
international relations, but, as a political system, it
continues to expand at a global level, giving rise to a new
form of contemporary terrorism.
Wahhabism has spread to Eastern Europe, Central Asia,
throughout the entire Middle East, as well as to large
parts of Africa and the United States. Governments from all
over the world are scrambling in attempts to prevent
further establishment of the so-called Wahhabi dens or
cells. Azeri newspaper Zerkalo in April 2005 noted that
Wahhabism is deeply rooted in Azerbaijan (Azeri Paper
Blames Spread of Wahhabism on Russia, 2005). The majority
of the Wahhabi adherents in Azerbaijan perform their
rituals in specific alternative mosques. Bosnian national
security specialist Radoslav Gacinovic observed that up to
tens of thousands of Wahhabis were granted citizenship in
Bosni-Hercegovina from 1989-2002 (Bokan, 2005). Countries
around the world are attempting to formulate laws and
programs to counter Wahhabi ideas (Chechen Leader, 2005)
Comprehension of the evolution of Wahhabism is crucial
to understanding that contemporary Wahhabism is not an
Islamic fundamentalist ideology but a comprehensive Islamic
9

based political system. In order to grasp the concept of
Wahhabism, one must have an insight into the Islamic
religion and the context with which its practices were
established in the Arabian Desert; in point, the political,
economic, and social contexts within which the Wahhabi
movement emerged along with the schools of Islamic
jurisprudence.
Chapter two will examine the concepts of ideology and
political system from a theoretical point.

Next, it will

focus on the birth of Wahhabism, a little explored, yet
vital, component of the complex system it represents today.
The al-Sa’ud has turned the birth of Wahhabism into a
religious myth, promulgating its legitimacy. This and the
absence of research have resulted in a lack of clarity in
terms of the initial relationship between the al-Sa’ud and
Abd al-Wahhab. An understanding of the birth of Wahhabism
can only come from the decodification of historical texts,
a number of which will be presented and discussed in this
study.
Chapter three examines the different Islamic schools
and political governance in relationship to Wahhabism.
Fundamental knowledge of Islamic governance is very
10

important in an understanding of the evolution of the
Wahhabi political movement. Since its inception, Saudi
Arabia has endured multiple political systems ranging from
tribal chieftains, to the sanctified Islamic prophet
Mohammed, to the Caliphates, to the Bedouin al-Sa’ud,
today’s contemporary tribal leaders.
Critical components of Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s
teachings were derived from the Hanbali Islamic school of
jurisprudence and the teachings of the Islamic scholar Ibn
Taimiyah. Chapter three will address these knowledge
systems cumulating in Wahhabi ideology, Abd al-Wahhab’s
belief system, which was employed to compose the aggressive
ideology that fueled the rapid spread of Wahhabism to the
tribes as a “way of life” or an “Islamic” political system.
Chapter four explores the historical elements that were
instrumental in the evolution of Wahhabism into today’s
political system, by examining the tribal and Islamic
contexts at the time of the emergence of Abd al-Wahhab as
political advisor to the al-Sa’ud. The “Islamic contract”
was one of strategy and calculation. It was unique at this
time since the tribes of Arabia had previously experienced
Islam, yet had abandoned its tenets only to have them
11

revitalized again through the al-Sa’ud Wahhabi Islamic
contract. This chapter includes the distributive economic
mechanisms present in the formative stages of Wahhabism and
the importance of the integration of Mohammed Abd alWahhab’s economic system into the al-Sa’ud political
unification strategy.
This chapter also presents an analysis that highlights
the al-Sa’ud utilization of the Wahhabi system in order to
consolidate and maintain power over the tribes of the
Arabian Desert. This junction is where the Wahhabi
political system came into existence. Wahhabi ideology had
gained the crucial element necessary for its propagation
through the al-Sa’ud: a legitimate authority with a goal,
to unite the tribes of Arabia and position themselves as
the ruling tribe of tribes.
Chapter five of this study will take a closer look at
Wahhabism as a political ideology and system since its
foundation in the Arabian Desert. A comparison will be made
between other Islamic movements including Jama’ai al-Islam,
the Society of the Egyptian Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda, and
Wahhabism. Relative highlights of the Wahhabi system will
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be addressed and illustrated. Finally, I will address
Wahhabi prophesizing, expansion and their implications.
This study represents a contextual analysis of select,
predominantly primary source texts on Islam, Arabia, Saudi
Arabia, and Wahhabism. A brief examination will be made of
early Islamic texts such as the Quran and the hadith--the
Islamic prophet Mohammed’s traditions which expand on an
early Islamic socio-political system--as well as texts and
oral traditions that influenced the Islamic scholars
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Ibn Taimiyah, and Hanbali. The
study will enable the reader to understand key Islamic
texts, considered fundamental to Wahhabism and critical to
its adherents. Many of Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings were not a
distorted radical version of Islam but basic components of
normal everyday Islamic practices. However, the context and
emphasis of particular texts and practices over others has
been extremely influential in the evolution of Wahhabism as
a versatile and extremely powerful contemporary political
system.
The lack of scholarly work on Wahhabism is mainly due
to the environment in which it emerged. Wahhabism emerged
in Saudi Arabia, a country in which contemporary,
13

scholarly, political research is generally prohibited,
either by denying visas to foreign academicians or by
denying passports and education to academicians who dare
delve in politically sensitive issues inside the country
(Saudi Arabia: A Secret State of Suffering, 2000). Those
who remain inside the Wahhabi system or the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia are not free to discuss or contemplate its
foundations or socio-political mechanisms of the current
regime. The punishment for those who reside within a
Wahhabi system and criticize Wahhabism is death by
execution (Three Saudis executed by beheading, 2005).
Neither do such systems allow foreign individuals or those
who are critical of Wahhabism to visit or maintain contacts
with other members of or residents in Wahhabi systems, in
order to obtain the statistical and analytical data
necessary to conduct qualitative research and analysis.
By illustrating the historical foundations, development
and implementation of Wahhabism as a political system and
comparing it with other Islamic movements, this study’s
objective is to enlighten readers and provide them with a
better understanding of the underlying mechanisms that are
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contributing to the emergence of contemporary Islamic
terrorism.

15

CHAPTER TWO: IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL SYSTEMS, AND
THE EVOLUTION OF WAHHABISM

In order to examine the development of Wahhabism from
an ideology to a political system, we must first consider
ideology and political systems from a theoretical position.
Ideology is a ubiquitous concept that has been defined and
redefined throughout history. Francis Bacon founded the
term ideology in his investigation of idols otherwise known
as prejudices and preconceptions which “impede the exercise
of scientific method” (Mullins, 1972, p. 499).
Subsequently, the ideologues, French post-enlightenment
theorists, envisioned ideology as a science of ideas,
allowing for further empirical examination. This study
addresses ideology from the perspective in which it
comprises a science of ideas.
However, the science of ideas must also be defined as
to its basic theoretical issues in order for it to be made
operational for empirical research. Ideology is politically
significant in that it constitutes the power to communicate
cognitions, ideals, evaluations, purposes, and logical
16

coherence among members of groups (Mullins, 1972). Mullins
reminds us that the significance of ideology in the
mobilization of group members is not so much that it is the
cause of one’s actions but that it provides a cause for
one’s actions.

Ideology, according to Mullins, is a

“logically coherent system of symbols” within a historical
conception, which “links the cognitive and evaluative
perception of one’s social condition” in particular, its
future prospects, “to a program of collective action for
the maintenance, alteration, and transformation of society”
(Mullins).
Wahhabi ideology enables members to assess their
political position, thereby facilitating the mobilization
and direction of resources and energies for common
political undertakings. The significance of ideology for
Wahhabism rests in the ability to communicate the
historical values and beliefs of Muhammad Ibn Abd alWahhab, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taimiyah and their
subsequent interpretations of Islam to the group.
Despite the proliferation of news reports and articles
about Wahhabism in its many different contexts, scholarly
pieces that address the birth of Wahhabism as a political
17

system are scarce. One reason for the lack of record is
that the creation of Wahhabism took place in Arabia among
nomadic tribes, not sedentary peoples. Therefore, much of
what we see written on the topic is derived from the
writings of renowned adventurers such as Harry St. John
Bridger Philby, also known as Jack Philby, T.E. Lawrence,
also known as Lawrence of Arabia, or Gertrude Bell.
Western adventurers’ analyses are recognized as
invaluable research, yet lack local perspective on
institutions and the relationship between Wahhabism as an
ideology and Wahhabism as a political system. The remainder
of writings occur in the form of religious texts as Islamic
jurisprudence and guidance, rather than as historical
narrative. It is necessary to decodify and deconstruct the
texts, jurisprudence, and guidance in order to examine
Wahhabism as an ideology which is the basis of the Wahhabi
political system and its techniques and institutions.
Society is, according to Leowenstein (1953), a system
of power relations. Political power represents the exercise
of social control by those who maintain power. The Islamic
community or Ummah as it existed in Arabia at the time of
Wahhab was the political system.
18

However, this system had

collapsed and its institutions had failed to maintain an
exercise of social control. After Abd al-Wahhab introduced
Wahhabi ideology, in connection with the al-Sa’ud,
Wahhabism as a political system emerged, along with the
agencies and instruments used to attain, exercise, and
maintain political power, although in the case of
Wahhabism, political power was camouflaged as Islamic
power. In essence, Wahhabism as an ideology was the motive
force, and its institutions and techniques are the tools by
which the ideology transforms itself into social and
political action.
The foundation of Wahhabism as a political system is
comprised of a religio-state power institution, Islamic
(Wahhabi) legal system, Islamic (Wahhabi) educational
system, and mechanisms and institutions that protect the
Wahhabi political system from attack. Unique, however, to
this Wahhabi political system is a form of virtual
government. The Wahhabi political system, unlike that of
the traditional state, does not require actual physical
territory. It can effectively control its members on a
global basis, without necessitating their residence within
the Wahhabi territory (Saudi Arabia), or more specifically,
19

the holy shrine cities of Makkah and Medinah. It is this
form of virtual political system that is so different from
traditional forms, which makes it ever more difficult to
examine, comprehend, define, and predict.
Wahhabism as an ideology was significant in the
formation and operation of the Wahhabi political system.
Wahhabi ideology heavily influenced the political systems’
institutions and techniques including constitutions,
administrative procedure, courts, and elections in the
Wahhabi political system. Another reason for the absence of
scholarly analysis on Wahhabism as a political system is
that it emerged in what is now the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
where such studies are prohibited (Bowers, 2004). In fact,
to declare Wahhabism the existing political system in Saudi
Arabia would be deemed treason, the penalty of which is
death by execution by sword (Warraq, 2004).
Wahhabism as a political system is intrinsically linked
to the control and power of the al-Sa’ud, Saudi Arabia’s
royal and ruling family. According to the al-Sa’ud, to
question the birth of Wahhabism is to question the
foundations of Islam, which originated from what is today’s
Saudi state. Wahhabism was initiated at the birth of
20

Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, from whose name the term
Wahhabism was coined and brought into being through a
culmination of his training, teachings, and subsequent call
for social reform among the Arabian tribes.
Born in Uyayna village in Nejd, Arabia, in 1703 AD, of
the Bani Tamim tribe, little is recorded about the first
thirty to forty years of Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s life
(Ahmad, 1993).

His ancestors can be traced back 16

generations to the time of the Unitarian (believer in one
God) ibn Taimiyah, the main source of Abd al-Wahhab’s
religious inspiration. Both Abd al-Wahhab’s father and
grandfather studied the works of Taimiyah who died in 1337
AD (Ibn Taimiyah Biography, n.d.). The teachings of
Taimiyah, an Islamic revivalist, whose ideas were still
very much alive during Abd al-Wahhab’s time in Arabia, and
his influence, will be presented in Chapter three.
Abd al-Wahhab’s grandfather, Sheikh Suleiman ibn Ali
ibn Mohammed ibn Ahmad ibn Rashid ibn Barid ibn Mushrif ibn
Alawi ibn Wuhib, was a renowned ecclesiastic and judge in
the town of Ayaina in 1668 AD (St. John Philby, 1955).
Mohammed Abd al-Wahhab spent many days at his father’s side
learning Islamic jurisprudence. His father was well versed
21

in the Islamic traditions that were passed down through the
years by the companions of the Islamic Prophet Mohammed.
The traditions outline the Islamic way of life ordaining
how men and women, boys and girls, merchants, students,
mothers, fathers, sisters, and brothers should live, even
prescribing the method of brushing one’s teeth (Elgood,
1962). His grandfather, father, and the Islamic scholars of
his time not only taught these principles but the
principles became Mohammed Abd al-Wahhab’s way of life. He
lived according to Islam in the Arabian Desert during a
time when the populations had relaxed their practice of the
often demanding Islamic religious traditions (Gibbons,
1776-1778).
Western and foreign influences in Arabia contributed to
the evolution of Wahhabism as an ideology and political
system. Makkah was a central focal point for many pilgrims
and a trade route where foreigners gathered to take
advantage of the lucrative business opportunities that
existed along the caravan routes (Mortel, 1995).
Makkah had a long history of sanctified importance as
the site of the Kaaba, a house with unique, acclaimed
spiritual powers (Gibbon, 1776-1778). The call for
22

spiritual blessings upon visiting the house in the Arabian
Desert spread throughout the region. This attracted people
from far reaching places to take advantage spiritually or
materialistically of the famous site (Ibrahim, 1982).
Edward Gibbon, another Western adventurer, described the
Kaaba and its existence before the Christian era in his
writings:
…Each tribe, each family, each independent warrior,
created and changed the rites and the object of this
fantastic worship; but the nation, in every age, has bowed
to the religion as well as to the language of Makkah. The
genuine antiquity of Kaaba ascends beyond the Christian
era: in describing the coast of the Red Sea the Greek
historian Diodorus has remarked, between the Thamudites and
the Sabeans, a famous temple, whose superior sanctity was
revered by all the Arabians; the linen of silken veil,
which is annually renewed by the Turkish emperor, was first
offered by the Homerites, who reigned seven hundred years
before the time of Mohammad (Gibbon, 1776-1778).
During Abd al-Wahhab’s youth, the Arabian Desert was
undergoing a period of social, economic, and political
transition. Nomadic tribes were becoming scarcer as trade
and populations grew. The period of the great Islamic
scholars had passed, and there was no longer a strong
central leadership, nor political or otherwise ideological
discourse, binding the peoples together. This vacuum
resulted in apathy among many, abuse among others, and the
23

potential for social resistance to the existent social
system.
Prior to this apathetic time, in general, there was not
much of a class system under Islamic rule. With the
decreased reliance on Islamic jurisprudence to govern the
masses there emerged, according to available Islamic
knowledge and research, a growing differentiation among the
tribal and immigrant people (Lewis, 1970). Those of the
lower classes tended to adhere to and promote Islamic
principles, allowing for them to transcend tribal class
barriers based on authority, wealth, and physical strength.
Sheikh Abdullah bin Ibrahim al Saif, the religious scholar
of the holy city of Madinah, bestowed the young adult
Wahhab, now in an elevated position holding the title of
Sheikh, with the honor of reciting traditions (Hidaayah,
n.d.).

The traditions that they studied were most often

those associated with a particular Islamic school of
thought. Just as the tribal poet was granted high positions
of honor and respect, so was the Islamic scholar, in
particular one who memorized Islamic traditions and texts
such as the Quran.
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During Abd al-Wahhab’s youth, his father was said to
have had to hold back his son’s passion for Islamic
practices because, at that time, the environment throughout
Arabia was not one of strict adherence to Islamic
tradition. The society was not, as Philby noted, “ripe for
conversion from the easy going ways of the time” (St. John
Philby, 1955). Islamic practices were taken lightly, not
least within the realm of sexual relations. In fact, the
social environment was such that not adhering to the strict
Islamic rules was not condemned but simply ignored.
Superstitious belief in sacrifices, the worship of some
tombs and the ability of inanimate objects, including
charms, trees and rocks, in order to speed up the
gratification of human desires was the norm. In his youth,
Abd al-Wahhab struggled to reject these un-Islamic
practices.
At home, Abd al-Wahhab’s family life was also filled
with uncertainty in terms of economic and socio-political
stability. His father, Abdul Wahhab, was removed from his
seat as Qadhi or judge in 1726 AD – a position he had
acquired following his grandfather Sheikh Suleiman’s death,
by a man named Mohammed Kharfash (St. John Philby, 1955).
25

Although little is reported in terms of his father’s
removal from this powerful position, in times of absolute
tribal influence and politics, such an event would have
been very traumatic in terms of maintaining tribal honor
and respect. Abd al-Wahhab’s whereabouts, during the time
of his father’s removal from one of the most prestigious
offices of the period, are not known. However, it is
anticipated that this event could have served as the
catalyst that thrust Abd al-Wahhab into the reform movement
that essentially began with his Islamic discourse.
Nevertheless, Abd al-Wahhab quickly rose to be one of
the few respected Islamic scholars in the Arabian Peninsula
(Kechichian, 1986). An important note about his methodology
and perhaps one of the most significant contributions he
made to the formulation of the Wahhabi movement is that he
is known to have based much of his discourse on a form of
classification based on creed. He divided believers and
non-believers into two separate and distinct camps; most of
his actions appear to be predicated upon this
classification (Brief Outline, 1930).
To some degree, the Nejdi versus Hijazi environments
may demonstrate this classification system (Cook, 1992).
26

The Hijaz region was on one of the major trade routes and
it was there that many foreign people passed through,
mingling with the local tribes. Power was concentrated in
Medinah, Makkah and Jeddah, the major cities of the region,
and was subject to exposure to those diverse and foreign
cultural differences (Ibrahim, 1982). Nejd society was
outside the realm of the strong foreign influence,
therefore, the Nejdi religious ulema–-the body of Muslim
scholars trained in Islam and Islamic law–-were less likely
to accept change or deviation from Wahhabi influenced
Islamic traditions. An incident in the early nineteenth
century, involving the Hijaz and the Nejdi peoples,
illustrates this form of classification when the ulema in
Makkah criticized the Nejdi ulema for declaring non-Wahhabi
Moslems among the infidels (Al-Ghafur, 1964).
Abd al-Wahhab was a traveller and there exists a
conspiracy theory related to his travels that describes his
meeting with a British spy named Hempher, in Basra (now in
modern day Iraq) around 1723 AD (Pasha, 1306). This spy
reportedly befriended him and educated him in a strategy to
consolidate the tribes under al-Sa’ud’s rule, through their
adoption and application of Abd al-Wahhab’s system. Other
27

reports note that the people of Basra banished him from the
city because of his extreme religious views (Dallal, 1993).
From Basra, Abd al-Wahhab travelled to Syria where he wrote
many books in response to the Arabia in which he lived,
condemning practices such as worshiping the dead and other
animistic beliefs prevailing amongst the tribal people of
the 18th century Arabian Desert.
Wahhab returned to the Nejdi town of Huraymila in the
Arabian Peninsula in the late 1730s, to see that people
were worshiping the dead Islamic Prophet Mohammed instead
of God or Allah (Dallal, 1993). He vowed to fight such
practices amongst the Shiite and local tribes and continued
to write and preach against them. One could point to this
intersection as key to the formation of the Wahhabi system
in that the populations codified the call for social
change. At this time, Abd al-Wahhab also began calling
himself a reformer, putting him in a position of religious
and political authority.
Abd al-Wahhab’s movement was labelled ad dawa lil
tawhid, the call to unity, with those following his
movement also known as the family of the unity or ahl al
tawhid (Glossary: Saudi Arabia). This call for unity or the
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oneness of God was also a clear method of identification
for those who became members of the Abd al-Wahhab social
reform movement. The idea of worshipping one God was not
new or different but Abd al-Wahhab attached political
importance to the idea by attacking, in particular, the
Shiite and condemning their practices and the influence
that such practices had on the local populations. As a
result, anyone who did not ascribe to the Wahhabi teaching
was deemed not of the true Islamic believers in one God;
therefore, they were cast into the opposite group, the
polytheists, or those who were guilty of Shirk (idolatry or
ascribing others to God) (Sirriyeh, 1989). Abd al-Wahhab’s
followers began calling themselves Muwahhidun (Unitarians –
of one God) and subsequently, those outside called his
following the Wahhabis. This distinct form of
classification is a critical key in the foundation of the
Wahhabi political system and aided the rapid spread of the
movement.
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[Insert Table 1 here]
The classification of Wahhabis versus practitioners of
Shirk was a founding principle of Wahhabi ideology and a
key factor in propelling the movement to the forefront of
social and political change. The concept of “the other” is
not new to international relations or political science and
it serves as an excellent tool toward accomplishing
alienation as well as to strengthen group identity. The Abd
al-Wahhab interpretation of Islam was that of either
belonging to the group and ascribing to the beliefs set
forth by him or being alienated as “the other” whether an
individual was a fellow Muslim, Christian, or Jew; an
interpretation that is against the teachings of Islam which
calls for respect for all “people of the book” which
included Christians and Jews as well as all Muslims.
During the time of Abd al-Wahhab and within the tribal
environment, survival was part of everyday life. In order
to survive, a sense of collective identity must exist. In
pre-Islamic Makkah, there are even reports of men taking
their entire families to the desert and committing suicide
because of financial disaster.

This ritual suicide or
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I’tifad resulted in starvation and death to avoid burden
being placed on the relatives or clan (al-Qurtubi & alQuran, 1967). If a tribal community embraced Abd alWahhab’s teachings, then those who did not would not have
been able to survive without the support of the collective
group. Even today, individuals who dare step outside the
group risk death, either through severe forms of alienation
(such as abandonment in the desert) or execution.
The political support that Wahhab sought was not
forthcoming in Huraymila, so he traveled back to his home
town of Uyaynah, where he managed to garner some support
from local leaders--not least Uthman bin Hamd bin Muammar
(Sa’ud Family, 2005). Mohammed Abd al-Wahhab was able to
transform his discourse on Islamic practice to discourse in
practice. He expanded the one God message to include a call
for strict adherence to Islamic law or Shariah (Sa’ud
Family). Therefore, those who adhered to the proclaimed
Wahhabi beliefs and values were tested on their belief by
their adherence to the practices put forth in Hanbali and
Ibn Taimiyah interpretations of the Quran and hadith or
Prophet Mohammed’s traditions.
[Insert table 2 here]
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Following the death of his father in 1740 AD, who had
often argued against some of his ideas, Wahhab asked the
tribal people to refrain from invoking dead or living
spirits to assist them in their daily lives. Next, he asked
them to stop associating other people or objects, whether
they were a prophet or angel, with God or Allah. These two
ideological premises of Wahhabism are extremely important
in its socialization practices: the stripping away of an
individual’s identity, first by taking away other vices
that may or may not provide comfort in times of trouble,
and secondly, by taking away the importance of any other
human or object in an individual’s life which because of an
attachment may be considered an association with someone or
something other than God.
Wahhab was adamantly opposed to constructing buildings
over graves and their decoration, to performing pilgrimages
to mosques other than the three proposed in Islam, and to
anything that associated others with God, including
celebration of the Prophet Mohammed’s birthday (Karawan,
1992). With Uthman Muammar’s assistance, Wahhab managed to
cut down trees worshiped for their spirits and destroy the
dome, which stood over the grave of Ziad ibn al-Khattab.
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Wahhab also had an adulterer stoned to death, a rarely
executed punishment (Familiarity, n.d.). These acts
symbolize Abd al-Wahhab’s intent to implement the complete
Islamic legal system as a way of maintaining law and order
in the tribal societies that existed during his time.
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[insert table 3 here]

In exchange for the support of Uthman, Mohammed ibn Abd
al-Wahhab “expressed hope” that the Nejdi people would obey
Uthman (Familiarity, n.d.).

The alliance with Uthman was a

unique moment in the birth of Wahhabism. Uthman received
Wahhab with honor and respect and provided him with the
material means to continue his revivalist journey to the
extent of reportedly giving him a woman by the name of
Jauhara. Wahhab is quoted to have told Uthman one day, “I
hope that, if you rise in support of the one and only God,
God Almighty will advance you, and grant you the Kingdom of
Nejd and its Arabs” (St. John Philby, 1955). Therefore, the
order of the day became condemning vice and commending
virtue with many common folks, Philby reported, joining the
ranks with enthusiasm (St. John Philby).
Wahhab did this discreetly at first, attempting not to
draw attention to himself by sending others to cut down
trees of veneration or giving a man his shirt in exchange
for his permission to cut down a tree. He gained a
reputation of courage and sincerity, and he became one that
many tribal people soon followed.
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The Islamic duties and responsibilities that Abd alWahhab promoted, with the exception of the birthday
celebrations for Prophet Mohammed, are existent amongst all
of the Islamic schools of thought, not solely within
Hanbali jurisprudence (Dallal, 1993). Neither did alWahhab’s calling differ from that of the Prophet of Islam,
Mohammed. Abd al-Wahhab did not differ in his discourse
from the original texts found in the Quran and hadith (a
report of the sayings or actions of the Prophet Mohammad or
his companions, together with the tradition of its chain of
transmission).
The town of Uyaynah was close to Al-Hufuf, one of the
eastern Arabian Twelver Shiite hubs, and their leaders were
troubled by the anti-Shiite tendency in the Wahhabi message
(The Sa’ud Family and Wahhabi Islam 1500-1818, 1992).
Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s call and reputation grew until
it reached Suleiman bin Mohammed bin Urair, the Shiite
governor of the affluent desert oasis Ahsa. Urair told
Uthman Muammar that Wahhab must be killed or else he would
cease giving him his kharaj or revenue. Uthman feared Urair
and the potential loss of sizeable revenue and ordered
Wahhab to be banished from Uyayna. Wahhab fled the town,
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travelling through the desert to Diriyah, near Riyadh, a
then impoverished town where the people lived in
destitution (Familiarity, n.d.). Although Wahhab had
managed to barter political support for his ideology in
exchange for obedience to the ruler, he still lacked the
economic institutions to turn his ideology into a
legitimate, fully accepted, self-supporting political
system.
Abd al-Wahhab resided in Diriyah as a guest of Abd al
Rahman bin Suwailim, who was paid a visit by Prince
Mohammed bin Sa’ud’s brothers. Through the brothers, alWahhab was introduced to the Prince Mohammed bin Sa’ud
(Hidaayah, n.d.). People came in great numbers to hear
Wahhab speak and though some accepted the call, others
adamantly opposed it, establishing many adversaries to Abd
al-Wahhab’s Islamic position. By now in alliance, Abd alWahhab and Prince Mohammed ibn Sa’ud, who was also the
Prince of Diriyah, had no choice but to use physical force
and their army of followers to defend the movement and ward
off the strong opposition.
Mohammed ibn Sa’ud died in 1765 AD, and he was
succeeded by his son Abd al Aziz ibn Mohammed ibn Sa’ud
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(The Sa’ud Family and Wahhabi Islam 1500-1818, 1992). Abd
al-Wahhab and Abd al Aziz continued the unique political
alliance, and they captured the capital city of Riyadh in
1773 AD (Rentz, 1972).
Abd al-Wahhab died in Dhul Qa’dah in 1791 AD. In order
to further examine Abd al-Wahhab’s discourse and its
transformation into political action, it is necessary to
explore the foundations of Islamic government their
relationship to the founding Wahhabi ideology.

37

Table 1.
Main Premise of Wahhabism as Ideology: Those Who
Ascribe Through Belief and Practice versus Those Who Do Not
UNITARIANS Muwahhidun

POLYTHEIST Those Committing Shirk

Those who practice Hanbali form
of Islam and Ibn Taimiyah
Interpretation

All others: those who practice
any other form of Islam, any
other religion, or no religion at
all.
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Table 2
Foundation of Wahhabi Political System Backed by the
Main Premise of Wahhabism as Ideology

UNITARIANS Muwahhidun

POLYTHEIST Those Committing Shirk

1. Those who practice Hanbali form
of Islam and Ibn Taimiyah
Interpretation

1. All others: those who practice
any other form of Islam, any other
religion, or no religion at all.

2. Those who practice strict
adherence to Wahhabi
interpretation of Islamic law or
Shariah

2. Those who practice any other
form of Islamic, tribal, or
foreign law.
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Table 3
The Muwahhidun Versus the Other: An Alienation of
Peoples
UNITARIANS Muwahhidun
1. Those who practice Hanbali
form of Islam and Ibn Taimiyah
Interpretation
2. Establish political norms
and rules-strict adherence to
Wahhabi interpretation of
Islamic law or Shariah

POLYTHEIST Those Committing Shirk
1. All others: those who practice
any other form of Islam, any
other religion, or no religion at
all.
2. Those who practiced any other
form of Islamic law or Shariah

3. Those who abandon earthly
representation and
relationships; destruction of
statues, trees, etc.

3. Those who create, build and
worship earthly representations
including statues, icons, stones
(as are used in Shi’ite religious
practices.

4. Legitimization of use of
force based on Wahhabi
interpretation of Islamic law

4. No use of enforcement of
Wahhabi interpretations. Freedom
of Islamic practices.

5. Acceptance of ideological
leader as judge capable of
enforcing legislation by force

5. Acceptance of other leaders or
cooperation between ideological
leader and other leaders.

6. Ideological movement
establishes proxy rule

6. Invalidation of proxy rule.
7. Alienation from society.

7. Political support provided
in exchange for support of and
adherence to ideological
premises which form basis of
government
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CHAPTER THREE: ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT AND WAHHABISM

As noted in the previous chapter, one of the
differences between Wahhabism as an ideology and Wahhabism
as a political system is the practice and enforcement of
Wahhabi ideological beliefs. This chapter will examine
those beliefs and their use in formulating government
institutions that are thus required for a political system
to function, including those institutions necessary to
exert some form of social control. Wahhabi social control
is achieved when the members of a society or community
believe in the Wahhabi version of Islam and Islamic
jurisprudence and consequently, accept the enforcement of
those beliefs.
Islam differs from other major religions in that its
texts stipulate a form of politics whereby there exists no
separation of state (dawla) from religion (din), nor is
there a division of religious and political organization
(Mortimer, 1982).

It has no church in terms of a corporate

body with distinct, defined leadership separate from the
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state (Brown, 2000). The ruler of the Islamic community or
state is the religious and political leader.

Islam is a

political religion; the Islamic community (ummah) is a
political and religious conception with an ongoing
significance within Islamic society (Cudsi & Dessouki,
1981).
Islamic ideology pre-dated Wahhabism; however, an
analysis of the relationship between Islam and Wahhabism
will demonstrate how the latter is a form of the revival of
the Islamic political system with strong roots in class
relationships that often exist within religious ideologies.
Certain aspects of Islamic governance are very
important in understanding the evolution of the Wahhabi
political system.

The Arabian Peninsula has been host to

several very diverse political systems ranging from tribal
chieftains to the sanctified Islamic prophet Mohammed’s
rule; and, following his death, to the Caliphates; finally,
there are the Al-Sa’ud, today’s contemporary, settled, yet
Bedouin, tribal leaders.

This chapter will examine the

different Islamic schools and their relationship, if any,
to Wahhabi ideology and political governance.
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Wahhabi ideology promotes the formation, existence and
resilience of the Islamic community or Ummah. The Islamic
community represents the embodiment of the laws of God with
the Islamic ruler having authority over the people to
enforce those laws (Saudi Arabia, n.d.).

The Islamic

community stresses the virtue of consistent and constant
fulfillment of the laws of God (Shariah) (Brown, 2000).
The origins of the word Shariah signify the path to the
watering place, also symbolic of the way to reach the
heavens, the main life goal of every Muslim. The Quran
dictates, "O you who believe obey Allah and obey the
Messenger and those in authority amongst you" (Quran,
4:59). Therefore, it is the duty of all Muslims to obey the
leader of the Islamic community: the one who, through his
enforcement of the Shariah, assists the community in its
path to heaven, hence, the watering place. It is only then
that the individual can attain his or her identity in
oneness with Allah or God.
Wahhabi ideology emerged within the Arabian tribal
society. Initially, mobile tribesmen with Islamic fervor
conquered what became the Muslim world.

These tribesmen

were also instrumental throughout the years in keeping the
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activist tradition moving.

Islam, and subsequently

Wahhabism, can be considered successful ideologies of
tribal mobilization (Cudsi & Dessouki, 1981). Wahhabi
ideology developed following a series of conquests into a
form of religious orientation combined with political
authority. Customarily, Islamic traditions did not allow
for the sustenance of tribal activism, since many of the
Bedouin traditions were not compatible with the dictates of
a strict adherence to the Islamic religion, which was
necessary to hold the Islamic community together.
For example, strict tribal and/or clan loyalty was not
conducive to the unification of multiple tribes under one
Islamic leader or ruler. Furthermore, the tribal system of
raiding for one’s own tribe or clan was not conducive to
the Islamic tradition of sharing the booty with several
clans or tribes. Therefore, tribal traditions facilitated
the spread of Islam but also prevented the unification of
tribes and the establishment of a central distributive
mechanism necessary for the founding of an Islamic
community. Furthermore, tribal traditions were heavily
laden with animistic beliefs focusing on several potential
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deities and subsequent practices, the majority of which did
not fit into the belief in one God.
Next, during the time of Muslim Caliphates, the
demobilization of tribal armies of conquest transformed the
social basis of Islamic politics.

This was, to some

extent, facilitated by the growing inability of Islamic
rulers to control those activists and their varying
interpretations of the religious callings and traditions.
New militaries and classes of political elites were formed.
Populations were converted en masse, making the privilege
of being the select class of Islamic subjects no longer
attractive for just that.
From its inception, the Islamic community became a
religio-political community, by a series of conquests
(Brown, 2000). However, in the early Islamic empire,
conversion was not encouraged in order to maintain the
Arabo-Muslim aristocratic status and to avoid the loss of
tax revenues (jizya) paid by non-Muslims to Muslims for
protection (Dhimma) and freedom from military duty.
The development of Islamic government in Arabia was
aided by the fact that the Muslim holy book, the Quran, was
written in Arabia (Elgood, 1962). Islamic texts guarantee
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the ruler of the Islamic community authority and legitimacy
(Quran) (Translation of Sahih Bukhari, n.d.). The Quran
ordains that all Moslems, “Obey Allah, and obey the
messenger and those of you who are in authority” (Quran,
4:59). This verse was recited to the Islamic Prophet
Mohammed. Following his death in 632 A.D., the Caliphs,
also Mohammed’s closest companions, were granted authority
to rule over the Islamic world, from Abu Bakr (632-634), to
Umar (634-644), to Uthman (644-656), and finally to Ali
(656-661) (Rightly Guided, 2005).

These first Islamic

rulers were also known as the rightly guided caliphs, all
very pious individuals, having served as the closest
companions of the Islamic prophet Mohammed.
of Ali, Islam witnessed serious divisions.

After the rule
In 656, Uthman

was assassinated, and Muhammad’s cousin Ali was sworn in as
the leader of the Islamic empire (Hinds, 1972).

This was a

breaking point in the early political leadership of Islam
and two sects emerged, the Kharijites and the Shi’a.

Ali

died in 661, and the Islamic world failed to witness the
same vitality until the emergence of Wahhabism in the
Arabian Desert.
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Yet, it was not just any desert; Arabia was the very
birthplace of Islam. Arabian territory hosts the two most
sacred Islamic shrines in the world: the Ka’aba (house
constructed in primitive days to worship one God) at Makkah
and the mosque and tomb of the ‘seal of the prophets,’
Mohammed ibn Abd Allah (born 570 A.D.), at Medinah (David,
1890).

One reason that Arabia remains the center of the

Islamic world is that one of the mandatory five pillars of
Islam is the pilgrimage to one of the sacred shrines, the
house built to worship one God (the Ka’aba) located at
Makkah, Saudi Arabia.
The fact that the two holiest Islamic shrines are
situated on Saudi territory grants the populations a form
of holy abode and dictates the premonition that the earthly
holiness transcends into the population’s physical being.
Therefore, Saudi Arabia serves as the leading Islamic
authority; its populations represent models of Islamic
conduct and practices for Moslems around the world.

As

birthplace of the founder of Islam as well as host to the
two most sacred Islamic sites, Saudi Arabia is considered
the spiritual leader of the Islamic world. (Metz, 1993).
So, how is it that the Saudi nationals are labelled as
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practitioners of Wahhabi Islam?

What links exist between

Islamic government and Wahhabism?
In the mid-18th century, the time of Sheikh Mohammed
ibn Abd al-Wahhab, there existed a loose form of Islamic
government, unlike the one posited originally by the five
rightly chosen Caliphs.

The Peninsular populations were

generally Moslem; however, the tribes, once again, were not
unified.

Although the populations had converted to Islam

from paganism, following the revelations to the Islamic
Prophet Mohammed, there remained very strong animistic
beliefs in spirits emanating from nature, statues, or the
dead (Abd al-Wahhab, Kitab at-Tawheed).

These beliefs had

to be curtailed in order to prevent the tribal people from
ascribing to alternative religions or cults.
The deviation from worship of one central, unifying
religion into the worship of several competing religions
may have posed a serious threat to the populations as they
existed in the harsh peninsular climate.

At a minimum,

Islam provided for the establishment of a sedentary life
form with an effective distributive mechanism. The
sedentary way of life in the Arabian Desert was nonexistent prior to Islam, and was found effectual for the
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collection of tax revenues, as well as a for providing for
a uniform legal code and books of uniform order and conduct
which took precedence over the often harsh nomadic
existence.
In addition to the importance of tribal unification,
the influx of foreign nationals created another class
amongst the Arabian tribes, the foreign immigrants who, as
traders or pilgrims, had entered the Peninsula and made it
their home.

These foreign people brought with them foreign

beliefs and practices that were not compatible with the
tribal culture.
However, Bedouin tribes used the foreign pilgrims and
traders to earn a living; some of the largest tribes like
the al-Harbi often survived the extreme Desert hardship by
robbing passing caravans or by selling hard-boiled eggs to
them on the roadside (.

Once these foreign peoples began

to settle along the trade routes or close to the religious
sites, the element of class was introduced into the
traditional tribal unit. The merchant class became an
important factor dividing the people. It was important that
the foreign elements were not rejected altogether by the
tribal Bedouins who had gone back to Bedouin customs
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(Mortimer, 1982). The combination of Wahhabism and Islam,
as a rational and civilized religion for the growing
sedentary populations, was an answer to the fragmented,
warring tribal Bedouin.
The development of Wahhabi ideology is key to the
development of the Saudi Arabian Islamic religio-political
system, otherwise known as Wahhabism.

How did Wahhabi

ideology develop and transform into a rudimentary political
system consisting of its own legislation and social
institutions?
An analysis of Wahhabism must take into consideration
the belief systems and practices integral to the ideology
and political system. It is through the Wahhabi belief
system that the ideology is formed. The subsequent practice
of those beliefs and the enforcement of the social
practices are a key component (as was discussed in chapter
two) of the Wahhabi political system. Islamic texts that
are integral to Wahhabi ideology are the Quran and hadith.
In the mid-18th century, Islamic studies elevated the
lower classes, often placing them in political and higher
social positions. This elevation of alienated and
disadvantaged members of society based on religious studies
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remains a strong component of Wahhabism today, one which
allows for the differentiation of a member of a Wahhabi
political system from a non-Wahhabi member of society.

[insert table 4 here]

Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab memorized the entire Quran
by the age of ten (.

His father taught him to read the

Quran, its interpretation or tafsir, and the Prophetic
traditions, concentrating on the books and writings, in
particular, of Sheikh Ibn Taimiyah and Ibn al Qayyim.

Abd

al-Wahhab was a scholar of the Hanbali School of Islamic
thought as well as the works of Islamic scholar Ibn
Taimiyah.
Ibn Taimiyah al Harrani, a Hanbali scholar, was also
known as Abu al Abbas Ahmad ibn Abd al Halim (Refutations,
2005). He died in 728 A.H. in a Damascus prison. His
teachings and views of Islam were often opposed by other
scholars. He represented an Islamic revival movement; his
teachings emphasized forbidding evil and promoting good.
Some of his main attacks were against the worship of
statues and pictures and oppression as well as earthly
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pleasures and commodities (Dallal, 1993).

He fought for

the utilization of God’s names in everyday life, the
unification of the Moslem people, Moslem brotherhood,
belief in the hereafter, and social equality. Many assert
that Wahhab’s beliefs were mainly founded from the
teachings of Ibn Taimiyah (Ibn Taimiyah, n.d.).

[insert table 5 here]
During the time of Sheikh Wahhab, all of the Islamic
schools of jurisprudence and thought and their respective
teachings existed throughout the Arab world.

The religious

schools did not form the basis of political legitimisation
in the Arabian Gulf, but rather, they were the basis of the
existence of different socio-economic systems within the
various tribes and regions.
Wahhabism as a political system has its own set of
social institutions including an educational system, which
promulgates its particular version of religiously oriented
ideology. In order to understand the complex Wahhabi
version, one must examine some key aspects of Islam.
Several sources of Islamic doctrine outline the Islamic way
of life, which reflect parallel sets of matching social
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institutions. Islamic scholars utilize these texts to
formulate the foundations of the Islamic community’s
political organization.

The foundations of the Islamic

community, otherwise known as the “way of life,” are put
forth in two main doctrines: the Islamic holy book, the
Quran, and the traditions or hadith of the Islamic Prophet
Mohammed.

The Quran, reportedly, was recited to Prophet

Mohammed from an angel named Gabriel, beginning when he
reached the age of forty, and continuing over a period of
23 years (Davis, 1890).

The Islamic Prophet’s traditions,

which included everything from the correct direction to
face while engaging in sexual intercourse to the method of
brushing ones teeth, were narrated and passed down by his
closest companions (Translation of Sahih Bukhari, n.d.)
Islam, like most other religions, hosts clergy or
religious specialists with authority over the community. In
Islam, the religious authorities are called the Ulema,
memorizing a large, mainly unchanging corpus of religious
text and knowledge, guardians and transmitters of the
Islamic theological and legal traditions. From the Ulema
emerge the fuqaha, those learned in the study of Islamic
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law (fiqh), who provide information for the judges (qadhis)
and jurisconsults of Islam (Brown, 2000).
Muslim political theorist Ibn Taimiyah devised a
political theory based on the Caliphate that symbolized the
existence of an ideal unified Islamic community or ummah.
Religious scholars interpret Islamic sources of knowledge.
Their analysis and interpretation are then decreed the
foundation of legal jurisprudence upon which the Islamic
community can abide.
Wahhabi ideology is based on a blend of the
jurisprudence of the Hanbali Islamic school, ideas
presented by Islamic scholar Ibn Taimiyah (including the
abandonment of all earthly pleasures and their
representations and the utilization of God terms in
everyday life), and Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s own
personal teachings. Early Islamic leadership led to the
proliferation of Islamic schools of law with approximately
500 of them disappearing from the 3rd to the 9th century
(Mez, 1937). However, the remaining four main schools of
Islamic thought resulted in the institutionalization of the
Islamic community’s legal norms. The four main schools of
Islamic thought are Hanbali, Shafii, Hanafi, and Maliki.
54

The Hanafi school of law was founded by the Iraqi Islamic
scholar Abu Hanifa (699-767); the Maliki by Malik ibn Anas
(715-795) from Medinah; the Shafii school by successors of
Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafii (767-820); and the Hanbali by
a student of Shafii-Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780-855) (Esposito,
1999). These main schools of thought differ greatly on
their emphasis on the Islamic sources of knowledge and
their interpretation.

It is the interpretation and

analysis of Islamic doctrine that forms the basis for
differing Islamic legal systems and likewise political
governance.
Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi was the first legal
theorist in Islam.

He attempted to balance reason and

tradition through a form of prioritization of the differing
Islamic knowledge sources or doctrine.

All Islamic schools

of thought accept the systematic prioritization of Islamic
sources of knowledge to different degrees.

The sources of

knowledge include the Quran, the hadith or traditions of
the Prophet, analogical reasoning or ra’y, and lastly, a
binding consensus qiyas.

Abd al-Wahhab’s Hanbali school

depends considerably on this particular methodology,
utilizing analogical reasoning as a “last resort.”
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The four schools of thought differ in interpretation
and analysis of Islamic jurisprudence.

The Hanafi gives

more weight to jurists’ analogical reasoning rather than
the hadith as a source of law.

Therefore, some might say

that it appears more flexible in decision making.

Maliki

is also critical of tradition/hadith; it bases its
decisions upon a form of North African/Spanish (Western)
consensual tradition.

A fifth Shiite school of thought is

named Jafari after the sixth Shiite Imam or priest Jafar
al-Sadiq (699-765), and it adheres greatly to the Hanbali
school of law, with the inclusion of the twelve Shiite imam
traditions along with the Islamic Prophet Mohammad’s
traditions (Esposito, 1999).

The Shafii, Hanbali, and

Jafari schools are criticized for utilizing traditions or
hadith to the extent that rational analysis or content
criticism is largely absent.

The schools that utilize the

Islamic traditions more than rational analysis are called
ahl al-hadith or family of those who adhere to the hadith
or traditionalists, and rationalists are referred to as ahl
ar ra’y.

The Hanbali School, more so than any of the other

existing schools, uses analogical reasoning as the final
source of Islamic knowledge.
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[insert table 6 here]
Islamic scholars, including the founder of Wahhabism,
Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, focused on and adhered to one
of these schools rather than several at the same time. The
schools were the basis of the political system’s
institutionalization of ideology with each explicating
specific government, educational, distributive, and legal
systems.
In early Islam, the masjids developed as schools or
colleges for the jurisconsults like Hanbali (Makdisi,
1979).

The Mosque served as an educational social

institution whereby Wahhabi ideology was propagated
(Leiser, 1981).

During the early stages of Wahhabism,

these institutions also served as social reproduction
institutions as they remain today.
Early Islamic scholars gained respect, an audience, and
their followers according to their ability to recite the
Quran and/or traditions of the Prophet Mohammed as well as
their application of them in everyday life.

The religious

scholar of the holy city of Medinah, Sheikh Abdullah bin
Ibrahim al Saif, asked the young Sheikh Mohammed ibn Abd
al-Wahhab to recite traditions-the second holiest source in
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Islam (Hidaayah, n.d.).

The traditions that they studied

were most often those associated with their particular
school of thought.

The Islamic scholar was awarded high

positions of honor and respect.

Abd al-Wahhab rapidly rose

to be one of the few respected Islamic scholars in the
Arabian Peninsula.

Yet, unique to Mohammed ibn Abd al-

Wahhab, was the fact that he not only served the al-Sa’ud
as an Islamic scholar, but as a political consultant and
advisor.
Contemporary Saudi Arabia is not exclusively based on
the Hanbali jurisprudence system.

In 1970, Saudi Arabia

set up a ministry of justice and the Shariah judicial
system was reorganized along a more Western model in 1974
(Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms:
Saudi Arabia, 2005).

Ibn Sa’ud’s attempts to codify

Islamic law were unsuccessful, so six books written by
Hanbali jurists were chosen for reliance in Shariah courts.
They are in order of priority-Sharaf al-Din Musa al-Hujawi,
K. Al-Iqna; Abu Mansur al-Bahuti, Kashshaf al-Qina an alIqna; Taqi al-Din al-Futuhi, Ibn al-Najjar, Muntaha alIradar; Al-Bahuti, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradar; Muwaffaq alDin;

and Qudama al-Maqdisi, K. al-Mughni, Shams al-Din Abu
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Muhammad b. Qudama al-Mugni li-Muwaffaq al-Din (Layish,
1987).
When those six Hanbali sources do not provide
provision, several qadhi(s) or judges are allowed to
utilize collective discretion, sometimes resorting to other
schools.

In agrarian regime matters, local custom has

become binding legislation in Shariah courts (Layish,
1987).

In the Hijaz in 1926, the laws, mainly Ottoman,

were adopted, and in 1932 following the Kingdom’s
unification, all legislation in force in the Hijaz was
extended throughout Saudi Arabia.

This adoption of Ottoman

legislation was based on the need to ensure legal
continuity and, in the absence of religious legal
literature, adequate provisions.

Today, the commercial

court (Mahkama al-Tijariya) and the Chamber of Complaints
(Diwan al-Mazalim) operate with extensive powers
concurrently with Shariah, even superseding it in some
cases.

Yet, Shariah criminal law still applies with the

severe punishments that it prescribes.

Today, there is a

tendency to replace prescribed Islamic punishments with
discretionary ones (ta’zir)-what Layish attributes to the
Wahhabi, not Ibn Taimiyah doctrine.
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This increases the

ruler’s power based on force and fear out of utilitarian
considerations.
From its inception in the late 18th century, al-Sa’ud
rule has remained dependent on a notion of a “divine
contract based on shariah or Islamic law” beginning with
the alliance between Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab and the alSa’ud (Kechichian, 1986). Under the guidance of Abd alWahhab, Muhammad ibn Sa’ud turned the capital of Arabia, Ad
Diriyah, into a center for Islamic study (Saudi Arabia:
Wahhabi Theology, n.d.).

This reinforced the notion that

Islamic study could elevate one’s social status. Next, they
sent missionaries to preach Islam throughout the Peninsula,
the gulf, Mesopotamia, and Syria (Saudi Arabia, n.d.). By
1803, the al-Sa’ud managed to expand their dominion from
Makkah to the small gulf country of Bahrain, conveniently
positioning educational and authoritative institutions such
as schools with teachers and state power apparatus. By
1818, when the Ottoman destroyed the al-Sa’ud stronghold
and Wahhabi political authority, Islam remained so
ensconced in southern Nejd and Jabal Shammar that it would
rise again to serve as the unifying ideology when the al-
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Sa’ud returned to their seat of power in the next century
(The Sa’ud Family and Wahhabi Islam, 1500-1818, 1992).
Islam, in the Wahhabi tradition, was, and remains, the
unifying factor which allowed Abd al-Aziz to consolidate
regions under his reign.

He used Wahhabi ideology to link

tribes from vast and far-reaching regions of Arabia into
one unified force.

Abd al Aziz’s rule over Arabia expanded

from the inception of the unique alliance in the late 18th
century to the early 19th century under his son Sa’ud, when
the Ottoman Sultan asked his Viceroy of Egypt, Muhammad
Ali, to liberate Makkah and reinstate Ottoman rule (Rentz,
1972). Ibrahim Pasha liberated Makkah from Sa’ud’s
successor, his son Abd Allah, ending a federation of
regions.

However, Wahhabism had really gained a foothold

in the region where previous tribal loyalties had been to a
degree replaced by a larger loyalty, one which guaranteed
the ultimate: equality for all, regardless of economic
status.
Wahhabi ideology remained strong in Arabia and Saudi
rule was reinstated in 1843 by Turki bin Abd Allah, a
cousin of the great Sa’ud.

However, this transition

remained one of the most important features of Wahhabism as
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a political system. At this point in the history of
Wahhabism, the prior institutionalization of one ruling
authority became one of multiple authorities, based on
Wahhabi ideology. Al-Sa’ud ruling territories had grown so
large that many of the regions had appointed governors and
judges to the towns and villages to represent al-Dariyya
and to implement Wahhabi Islamic principles.

Turki ibn Abd

Allah used the loyalty of the governors to reunite Arabia.
He informed the governors that the ability to reunite was
based on Islam (in reality Wahhabi Islam) rather than the
use of pure force. Therefore, Wahhabi Islam became an
institutional mechanism, just as Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab
and the al-Sa’ud predicated it previously, to enforce
social control, replacing the single Islamic ruler with a
type of rule by proxy.

Early Islam → Small local population → (Makkah) One
ruler → Direct rule
Greater Islam → Large areas conquer/convert → Multiple
ruling authorities → Rule by proxy
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The idea of the potential to establish and maintain a
political system based on rule by proxy is one which made
Wahhabism one of the strongest and viable Islamic political
systems in the world. Aided by the location and religious
representation of Makkah and the necessity of every Moslem
to pray and worship toward Makkah, although he or she may
live thousands of miles away, the rule by proxy was even
more successful. Wahhabism had taken root in a complex
matrix of tribal and religious practices to form a
comprehensive political system, ready to be put into
action.
[insert table 7 here]

In 1912, there was a revival of Wahhabism which led to
the formation of a religious settlement at Artawiyah, a
village about 300 miles north of the capital city of
Riyadh, but this time it was under the auspices of the
Islamic brotherhood, also known as the Ikhwan (Habib,
1997). This small town expanded quickly to a population of
over 10,000 former Bedouins, who suddenly began devoting
their lives to farming and learning the Quran. The Ikhwan
enforced Islamic forms of worship through physical
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beatings.

They also enforced closing shops at prayer times

and governed personal appearance, including forbidding long
moustaches.
Four years later, another significant development
occurred in the evolution of Wahhabism as a political
movement. In 1916, Ibn Sa’ud designated himself ‘King’
along with his former title of Imam (Kechichian, 1986).
This was the first time that the al-Sa’ud actually
combined, in terminology, the head of state’s political and
religious titles. This transformation could have occurred
because Ibn Sa’ud signed a treaty with Britain that
recognized him as the sole ruler or King of the Nejd and al
Hasa regions the same year (Al-Farsy, 1999). Ibn Sa’ud was
secure enough in his Wahhabi orientation that he was able
to acquire a secular title without opposition. The
solidification of the Islamic community’s acknowledgement
of the Wahhabi combination of a secular oriented head of
state with the religious institutional apparatus was
recognized publicly.
Another turn of events took place in 1924.
Approximately 3000 Ikhwan stormed, looted, and set Taif on
fire, also killing 300 townsfolk. They smashed all of the
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mirrors that they could find.

After this, Ibn Sa’ud

prohibited such killing and looting; by 1926, most of
Arabia fell to the al-Sa’ud, including Makkah, Jeddah, and
Medinah.

In 1926, an Ikhwan attack against an Egyptian

Hajji and his loud brass band forced Ibn Sa’ud to rid the
cities of the Ikhwan and keep them in the desert.

Ibn

Sa’ud then fought the Ikhwan with cars and demolished most
of their stronghold in the Kingdom by 1929 (Nkrumah, 2004).
Key to Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings was his philosophy,
some assert, to convert political loyalty into a religious
obligation.

In Islamic doctrine, the separation of church

and state as is recognized in the West does not exist.
Political loyalty is a religious obligation as was pointed
out at the beginning of this chapter.
Abd al-Wahhab called for the unquestionable allegiance
to the ruler as long as the authority directs his community
in accordance with Islamic law (Doumato, 1992).

This

bolstered the ability of Wahhabism to reproduce itself as a
political system because it prevented issues of succession
to interfere or weaken legitimization of the Wahhabi
authority. In Islamic sources of knowledge, it is not fixed
that a ruler is beyond question.
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Yet, with the opposition

that existed during Abd al-Wahhab’s time to any political
attempts to unify and settle the tribes under one ruler,
perhaps it was the only way to attain that goal.

After

Abd al-Wahhab died, the al-Sa’ud used force to conquer and
re-conquer the Peninsula; however, once that was
accomplished, they tended to practice a more accommodating
policy.

This, perhaps stemming from Bedouin tribal

traditions, has been a key aspect of the legitimisation and
maintenance of al-Sa’ud rule, since the founding of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Whatever its origins, there

continues to be the belief in the necessity of an
unquestionable loyalty to the Islamic leader as long as he
retains the traditional-Wahhabi ideology and continues the
proliferation of Wahhabi institutions locally and abroad.
Today, whatever legitimization remains, may not be
directed toward the sanctified rulers but rather in
response to the false enemies or bete noir that the alSa’ud have created in order to maintain their fragile
legitimacy. The al-Sa’ud are now cautiously secularizing
the same Wahhabi institutions they formed during their
ascent to power in an effort to maintain legitimacy or
power over the populations. Chapter five will address
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Wahhabism in its contemporary form as it exists in the
Kingdom’s extremely fragile and problematic society today.
But first, this study will examine the relationship between
the al-Sa’ud and Wahhabism, mainly how those strong
foundations and political institutions were established,
and finally, how the Wahhabi political institutions are
being dismantled by the same family that erected them in
the first place.
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Table 4.
Foundations of Wahhabi Based Class System
Wahhabism
Study of Wahhabi
interpretation of Islam
according to Quran and
Hanbali hadith and teachings
of al-Wahhab.
Elevated
social
class-the
holy ones
Invited
into
upper
class
society power circles

Non-Wahhabi
Lack of religious study or
study of multiple religious
texts other than Quran and
hadith according to multiple
schools of jurisprudence
Lower class-the infidels
No affiliation
or upper class
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Table 5
Differentiation between Wahhabi and non-Wahhabi
according to Wahhabi Ideological Belief System
WAHHABISM
Study of Wahhabi
interpretation of Islam
according to the Quran,
Hanbali hadith, and the
teachings of al-Wahhab.
Elevated social class
Total rejection of earthly
pleasures as represented in
pictures and statues (Ibn
Taimiyah)
Utilization of the 99 names
of God in everyday life
including assigning first
names (Ibn Taimiyah)

NON-WAHHABI OR INFIDEL
Lack of religious study or
study of multiple religious
texts and opinions other than
Quran and hadith emanating
from multiple schools of
jurisprudence
Lower class
Allow for representations of
earth, i.e. pictures, statues
Naming utilizing other than
99 names of God
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Table 6
Different Schools of Islam and Key Components of the
Belief Systems
Hanbali
Ahmad ibn Hanbal
(780-855)
1-Quran 2-hadith
or traditions of
the Prophet 3analogical
reasoning or
ra’y 4- binding
consensus qiyas
Rational
analysis absentahl al hadith
Final School

Shafa’i
Muhammad ibn
Idris al-Shafii
(767-820)
balance reason
and tradition
through
prioritization

Hanafi
Iraqi Abu Hanifa
(699-767)

Minimal rational
analysis present
ahl ar-ra’y

Rational
analysis present
ahl ar-ra’y

Second to last
school

First school

more weight to
jurists’
analogical
reasoning as
source of law
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Maliki
Malik ibn Anas
(715-795) from
Medinah
consensual
tradition

Rational
analysis
tradition ahl
ar-ra’y
Intermediate
school

Table 7
Wahhabism as an Ideology and a Political System

WAHHABISM
Ideology
Belief in Muslim vs. Infidel.
This belief separates all forms
of Islam from the Wahhabi
version of Islam

Belief in Heaven vs. Earth and
struggle to separate oneself
from earthly representations of
all kinds. (This belief is often
tested with sacrifice of
material and human needs
demonstrating member’s adherence
to the community)

Belief in the utilization of
Godly Names/Holiness in everyday
life

Belief that authority only rests
in God and a Muslim’s belief in
God.

Political System
Mosque operates as socio-political
educational and legal institution.
Wahhabi rules, regulations, and
legislation are enforced by the
community with the leading Islamic
figures serving as the political
authorities
Central Distribution System whereby
Islamic Taxation and Charity
provide for the Wahhabi community.
The taxation and charity comes from
a network of corporate, individual,
governmental and non-governmental
organizations to promulgate
Wahhabism at a global level. Funds
are transferred electronically and
via messengers and distributed
among the community of believers
A set of institutions or mosques
that recognize Makkah as the
territorial symbol of removal of
earthly pleasures and the heavenly
realm. Makkah represents a virtual
territory as the house of supreme
Islamic religious authority-Allah
Multiple Leaders by Proxy. One
legitimate leader represented in
Allah or God. Proxies rule by the
word of God or Allah as written in
the Quran and traditions (hadith).
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE AL-SA’UD AND THE ISLAMIC
CONTRACT

As noted in previous chapters, Wahhabi ideology, the
basis of Wahhabism as a political system, along with its
unique set of political institutions including rule by
proxy, the mosque as a social reproduction institution, and
an Islamic distributive system, comprise one of the world’s
most unique, potent and viable political systems.

This

chapter examines the politicization of Islam through
Wahhabi ideology in Saudi Arabia with an emphasis on state,
economy, and society or the transition from Wahhabism as an
ideology to a political system. The Al-Sa’ud’s Wahhabi
Islamic contract was one based on the emergence of a need
for social institutions which would assist in uniting the
tribes of Arabia into a unified population capable of
supporting itself from within and fighting off the external
enemies of the time.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is known as the spiritual
leader of the Islamic world. Its territory is documented as
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the birthplace of a man known throughout Islamic texts as
the ‘seal of the prophets,’ Mohammed ibn Abd Allah, born in
570 A.D. (Metz, 1993). Saudi Arabia is also home to, as
well as the guardian of, the sacred mosques at Makkah and
Madinah, two of the holiest sites in Islam. Islamic law
requires all able Moslems to make one pilgrimage during
their lifetime to Makkah to fulfil their Islamic religious
requirements.
Is Saudi Arabia an Islamic community behind the guise
of a “state (dawla)” or is it a state whose authority is
based on the Islamic religion?

This chapter presents a

condensed history and development of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia in order to achieve a better understanding of the
ruling al-Sa’ud family’s politicization of a Wahhabi
version of Islam to promulgate and sustain its absolute
authority, power, and rule over, not only the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, but, the Islamic world.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been based on Wahhabism
as its political system, or the notion of a “divine
contract based on shariah (Islamic law),” from its
inception. This contract was implemented upon the alliance
formed between tribal adviser Abd al-Wahhab and the
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contract’s founder, Abd al-Aziz– who further consolidated
the alliance by marriage to Wahhab’s daughter (Kechichian,
1986). Islam was the unifying factor or catalyst that
allowed Abd al-Aziz to consolidate regions under his reign.
Utilizing Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s ideology, Abd
al-Aziz linked the Arabian tribes into a unified force. Abd
al Aziz’s kingdom grew from the beginning of the unique
alliance with Wahhab in the late 18th century, through the
early 19th century where it continued expansion under his
son, Sa’ud and his successor Abd Allah (Rentz, 1972). The
Ottoman Sultan temporarily halted the Saudi rule of a
federation of regions in 1818 AD by securing the assistance
of his Viceroy of Egypt, Mohammed Ali.

Ali sent Ibrahim

Pasha to free Makkah from the al-Sa’ud and reinstate
Ottoman rule, liberating Makkah from Abd Allah (Rentz). As
noted earlier, this was the critical stage of transition
between direct authoritarian rule and rule by proxy so
evident in Wahhabism today.
However, Wahhabi initiated rule by proxy endured and
Saudi rule was restored in 1824 by Turki bin Abd Allah, the
nephew of Abd al-Aziz, cousin of Sa’ud. Previously al-Sa’ud
ruled territories had grown so large that many of the
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regions had appointed governors and judges to the towns and
villages to represent the incumbent ruling tribe, alDiriyah, and to implement Wahhabi principles and practices.
Turki ibn Abd Allah used the governors’ loyalty to al-Sa’ud
to reunite Arabia. He advised the governors that the
ability to reunite was based on Islam rather than the use
of pure force. Serious oppression of subjects was
punishable with exile (Rentz, 1972).
Turki’s actions are a key element to understanding the
successful maintenance of the al-Sa’ud Wahhabi style
legitimacy and rule. Turki advanced that legitimacy by
emphasizing tribal values along with Wahhabi ideology,
creating a powerful and effective authoritative
combination. An advanced system of loyalty, honor, respect,
and obedience is embedded in tribal members from birth and
that very system is utilized to ensure the tribe’s survival
– as among the Bedouin where their personal loyalty lies
with their own kin (Rosenfeld, 1965). A tribal man cannot
regain his lost honor in the community, so it was mandatory
that the tribal people be treated with honor and respect to
sustain tribal loyalty and obedience to the al-Sa’ud.
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Al-Wahhab used the concept of alienation to promote
Wahhabism in the Peninsula years prior because he
understood that the alienation of a single tribe member for
any reason could result in alienation of the entire tribe.
The loss of one member of a tribe could affect the loyalty
of the entire tribe (possibly an entire territory) and,
consequently, exponentially reduce the al-Sa’ud’s revenue.
The shift from a tribal system to a Wahhabi Islamic
system was facilitated by the fact that both systems
guaranteed the leader’s honor and legitimacy based on his
position or class.

Abd al-Wahhab is noted to say that

there should be unquestionable allegiance to the ruler as
long as he directs his community in accordance with Islamic
law (Doumato, 1992).

According to Islamic sources of

knowledge, rulers are not absolutely beyond question.

Yet,

with the opposition that existed in the late 18th century to
attempts to unify and settle the tribes under one ruler,
perhaps it was the only way to attain unification.
From the beginning of their rule, the al-Sa’ud and
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab initiated an economic system
whereby governors and judges served as collectors of the
tax (Dallal, 1993). The alms paid their salaries, even
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though their duties went far beyond the tax collector.
Turki, like his predecessors, utilized the Wahhabi system
of combining rule with religion, to justify levying taxes,
as an instrument of state power to consolidate the people
under their rule and to maintain control over the region’s
large socio-economic distributive mechanism by using the
Wahhabi-al-Sa’ud system of equating al-Sa’ud’s rule with
submission to Islam.
According to Islam, Zakat is annual, obligatory alms to
be used for very specific purposes (Quran: 2:261). The
Quran states that Zakat is to be used for "the poor, the
needy, those who collect them, those whose hearts are to be
reconciled, to free the captives and the debtors, for the
cause of God, and for travelers; a duty imposed by God. God
is All-Knowing, All-Wise" (Quran, 9:60). In addition to the
hajj or pilgrimage, Zakat is the third of the five pillars
of the Islamic faith.
The Arabian tribes accepted the relationship between
the leader, now coined King and the Ulema or religious
authority, similar to the relationship, which existed
between Abd al-Wahhab and Abd al Aziz in the late 18th
century.

Abd al Aziz had once held the esteemed title of
77

Imam; therefore, there were few, if any, who questioned his
faith, and subsequently, his right to right to rule an
Islamic community.

To question an Imam is almost

equivalent to questioning the religion itself or blasphemy.
Next, in 1925, Ibn Sa’ud expropriated the rights of the
tribes to their own territory or diras (Al-Rasheed, 1996).
Land redistribution did not begin again until 1964.
Everyone can apply for a piece of land; however,
distribution is limited and carefully controlled.

Access

to land meant being a part of the al Sa’ud patronage
network.
Abd al-Wahhab required adherence to the principle that
the ruler should be unquestionable as long as he ruled
according to Islam, in his case the Wahhabi understanding
of Islam.

Therefore, as long as the Wahhabi based ulema

were with Abd al Aziz, there could be no question regarding
his right to rule.

The ulema assisted Abd al Aziz by

siding with him against the ‘extremist Ikhwan’ who were
often an embarrassment with their random raids, which
created problems among their neighbors.

A unique

relationship between the founder of the modern day Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia and the accepted religious authorities or
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ulema commenced.

This relationship made demands on the

public, including tax collection, easier to achieve.
Zakat or payment of the tax need not be forced; only a
strict belief in Islam needs to be maintained in order for
the people to feel the need to pay taxes and likewise to
feel guilty if they do not. It became mandatory that the
populations equate the Saudi ruling regime with the cause
of God to sustain al-Sa’ud’s legitimacy, not only to rule
but to collect the taxes that financed their purpose. The
al-Sa’ud used the Islamic tax-zakat to support a wideranging campaign of conquest.
This was the beginning of the al-Sa’ud socio-economic
distribution center and the commencement of the largest
religious propaganda system in the world. As long as there
remain non-Islamic peoples and places to conquer, the Zakat
funds will continue to fall into the hands of those who
maintain control over Islam’s holy sites. With Zakat being
a foundation of Islam and the propagation of Islam resting
partly on the collection and distribution of Zakat for
“those whose hearts are to be reconciled,” then the Wahhabi
based distribution center will continue to function (Dhimmi
Watch, 2005).
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Turki was assassinated in 1834 AD to be succeeded by
his son Faisal bin Turki who ruled until he was captured by
Mohammed Ali and jailed in Cairo (Philby, 1955). Faisal
escaped in 1843 and returned to the Nejd, restoring the
symbols of the al-Sa’ud rule at the holy sites of Makkah
and Madinah.

Triumph was short-lived and the reign of the

al-Sa’ud descended into turmoil culminating in the family
being driven into exile in Kuwait, by the rival al-Rashid
family who were then in alliance with the Ottomans.
Early in the 20th century, Faisal’s grandson Abd alAziz ibn Abd al-Rahman al-Faisal al-Sa’ud re-established
al-Sa’ud’s position as ruler by recapturing Riyadh from the
Rashidis. The victory was made significant by Ibn Sa’ud’s
deployment of, reportedly, only twenty men and achieved by
the assassination of the Rashidi governor of the city
(Mortimer, 1982).
Initially, Ibn Sa’ud held the title of Imam or
religious leader; however, in 1921 he changed his ruling
title to the secular title, Sultan (Mortimer, 1982).

Next,

he recaptured the Islamic holy shrine cities of Makkah and
Madinah and in 1932, consolidated the Hijaz and Nejd
regions, after which he called himself King.
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King Abd Aziz

then named the regions under his reign the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. It remains the only country in the world named
after a ruling family.
During this period, jurists began to acknowledge that
the Islamic Caliphate or religious leader of the community
had emerged into a dynastic monarchy (Lewis, 1974). This
could be because it was apparent that the Islamic community
was actually a combination of secular and religious aspects
of governance. Also, British influence was strong in the
region and their power mechanism was the royal ruling
family. Wahhabism was a component of Arabian society and
the al Sa’ud was the uncontested ruling authority.
Acceptance of the close relationship between King Abd
Aziz and the Islamic religious body, the Ulema, grew. The
Ulema also supported King Abd Aziz by siding with him
against the extremist nomadic elements of the Ikhwan– the
Muslim Brotherhood opposing secular tendencies of Islamic
nations and devoted to strict Hanbali Islamic rites,
combining military, agricultural and missionary functions
(Kechichian, 1986).

The Ikhwan were creating problems among

neighboring regions by carrying out random raids.

King Abd

Aziz, in an attempt to resolve the problem, established two
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hundred new settlements to be inhabited by the Ikhwan to
influence their assimilation of a sedentary society
(Glossary: Saudi Arabia. (n.d.).
The Wahhabi predicated relationship between the founder
of the modern day Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the accepted
Wahhabi based religious authorities grew. The Ulema were
exchanging or bartering their authority and legitimacy for
the Kingdom’s religious power, which the al-Sa’ud was happy
to concede as long as its own legitimacy went unquestioned.
Al-Sa’ud’s main interest in Islam emerged as tax or Zakat
collectors besides utilizing it for legitimacy purposes.
The al-Sa’ud had successfully enforced rule by royal
succession. King Abd Aziz died in 1953 and his son Sa’ud
succeeded to the throne. He was a spendthrift, playboy and
ineffective ruler. In 1964, the al-Sa’ud family, with the
consent of the religious leaders and the Ulema, deposed
Sa’ud and made one of his six other brothers, Crown Prince
Faisal ibn Abd al Aziz al Sa’ud, King (Mackey, 2005). A
second brother, Khalid, served as Crown Prince. Uunlike his
predecessors, King Faisal was a practicing and devout
Moslem, interested in modernizing the Kingdom and educating
the masses, while maintaining an Islamic base.
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His nephew, the son of his brother Khalid, assassinated
King Faisal in 1975 (Metz et al, 1993). However, the Saudi
population now had a vision and hope that a leader, such as
King Faisal, could ascend to the throne again. Great
numbers of Saudis named their children after King Faisal,
known for ruling with piety, justice and strength.
Hospitals, charity organizations, welfare associations and
academic institutions were named after the late King
Faisal.
King Faisal proposed the creation of a consultative
council in 1964 as a means of giving more voice to the
people in line with Islamic tradition. The council was not
realized until August of 1993, almost thirty years later
under the rule of the late King Fahd (Saudi Arabia
Constitution, 1993).
Following the death of Faisal, his brother Khalid
became King, and Fahd, his younger brother, was appointed
his Crown Prince. During Khalid’s rule, al-Sa’ud suffered
its first criticism of Western cultural influence on the
royal family due to its leaning toward a more secular state
policy in regards to Western, in particular, U.S. interests
in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism as a political system demands
83

for strict adherence to Wahhabi ideology, an aspect of
which calls for the complete separation of those who
believe and those who do not as demonstrated in previous
chapters.
Due, in large part, to the al Sa’ud alliance with nonWahhabi Islamic elements and their Commodification of
Islam, an attempt was made to take over the Grand Mosque at
Makkah, within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by Saudi
nationals in 1979. The rebels were later captured and
beheaded, throughout the Kingdom over a period of weeks, to
serve as an example to others (Kechichian, 1986). The alSa’ud had begun the tightrope walk between the Wahhabi
political system that they were instrumental in forming and
a political system, which would allow for rationalization
instead of traditionalism to play a greater role in their
authoritarian rule.
The rebellion sent a signal to the rest of Saudi
Arabia. It was not that the royal family had ceased to
practice Islam nor that the West had too much influence in
the Kingdom. The attack was perceived as directed against
the legitimacy of what had now become the al-Sa’ud
political machine – an institution that was seen to dispose
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of any obstacle in its path. The dichotomy of al-Sa’ud’s
rule was thus exposed.

Their power could not be used

against the rebels in an attack at the two of holiest sites
in Islam.

Such an act of aggression would be a violation

of those sites and judged as blasphemous by the Islamic
world.
The al-Sa’ud and the Ulema consolidated their efforts
on issues affecting security (Bligh, 1985). The majority of
the Ulema viewed the Makkah uprising as a threat to unity
and as an attack on their credibility.
King Khalid died in 1982, less than five years after
the uprising, leaving Fahd to address the fortification of
the house of al-Sa’ud (Layish, 1987). Fahd made enormous
fiscal investment in neighboring countries and to
dissenters of Western culture and other foreign supporters,
to foster outside support, while granting the Saudi Arabian
religious authorities, the police force, and localized
religious leaders’ extensive license within the Kingdom
(Saudi Arabia Invests USD one billion in Algeria, 2004)
(Saudi Arabia invests $150 million in Sudan’s Merwe Dam
Project, 2003). The extension of the al-Sa’ud power was not
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limited to the streets, shops, schools and mosques. The
authorities seized the power to enter the private domain.
The mutawaeen (members of the Committee for the
Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice) and their
bands of followers began searching the streets for any
dissenters from Islam, chasing and beating people without
apparent reason. They enforced strict adherence to the
closure of shops and businesses during prayer times, the
complete veiling of women – a practise that is not dictated
in Islam – and all other elements of the conservative
Wahhabi code. Local Saudi police and the National Guard
gave free reign to the mutawaeen. Saudi police were also
given extra authority and an unofficial curfew throughout
the 1980s was enforced. Police patrolled the streets in
search of anyone afoot after 10:00 p.m. with the authority
to stop and question the individual’s purpose for being in
that neighbourhood. The police would also interrogate
others to confirm the validity of people’s statements.
The local Imam was considered the Islamic prayer leader
within the small community where his Mosque was situated
and the al-Sa’ud began recruiting them to report on the
community’s activities and keep track of their
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congregation. Imams were given specific details on members
of the congregation within their local area of
responsibility, which varied in size from approximately 20
to100 families. The head of the household, together with
his sons, was expected to attend the daily Maghrib or
sunset prayers and especially the Friday prayers. If a man
did not attend prayer services, he was reported.
Imam’s walked the neighborhoods taking different routes
to prayer every day, to stop and talk to the men in the
street. A car missing from its normal parking space at
night would prompt the local Imam to question that man or
his neighbors, on his whereabouts and the justification for
missing prayers at the neighbourhood mosque (Knighthawk,
2002).
Realizing the potential power of the Imams, the alSa’ud stationed spies at meetings that brought together
groups of women or men to discuss Islam and at prayer
services in the mosques, to listen to the Imam’s sermons.
In most cases, the spies were typically comprised of single
mothers, widows or men unable to support their families.
The government informants are paid for by Zakat and heavy
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oil revenues to spy on Saudi nationals and report on their
activities (Isikoff, 2004).
The informants report any Imam, religious leader, or
scholar who announces a translation of the Quran or hadith,
that conflicts with the al-Sa’ud interpretation of Islam.
The individual is, at times, forced to issue a public
apology for misunderstanding and misrepresenting Islam or
he or she can be banned from speaking or attending public
meetings. This telltale practise became so prevalent in the
late 1980s that followers saw some of their most respected
Islamic leaders apologizing for their own lack of Islamic
knowledge. Not only did these actions bring public
embarrassment to the reputable religious leaders but also
greatly decreased al-Sa’ud’s ability to contain dissent
within the Kingdom (Ulemas and Sheikhs Consider the
Withdrawal of Sheikh al-Fahd and Sheikh al-Khudair a New
Blow to Those Who Try to Disturb the Security and Stability
in the Kingdom, 2003).
In fact, the recently deceased King Fahd changed his
name from the secular title of King to the sacred
classification of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques in
November, 1986 in an effort to stave off rumors that the
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royal family was no longer leading the Islamic community
according to Islam (Sabertooth, 2003).

The al-Sa’ud became

more dependent on support from outside the Kingdom and
subsequently strengthened its alliance with the West, while
openly creating an external enemy of the Western-allied
Israelis – using their conflict with the Islamic
Palestinians – to divert the now dangerous tensions
building within its society. As long as the al-Sa’ud could
maintain this enemy of Islam, they could maintain the
façade that they indeed continued to adhere to Wahhabi
Islamic ideology.
However, the deterioration of relations between the
religious authorities and the al-Sa’ud paralleled the
increasingly overburdened economic situation, although the
state of the economy was not a cause but a contributor to
weakening relations. Inequalities present in the population
grew wider as subsidies decreased between 1985 and 1992,
despite ample oil revenues and the population’s ability to
pay taxes. In 1994, King Fahd announced a budget cut of
approximately 19% and some reports estimate a Saudi
government deficit of $10.7 billion in 1994 (Prados, 1996).
Decreased oil revenues, an exploding population and the
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Gulf war were said to have cost the Saudi government around
$55 billion, aside from the almost $17 billion provided to
the U.S. to defer the Gulf War costs (Prados).
The al-Sa’ud economic system’s inequalities brought
into question the adherence of the al-Sa’ud to the longstanding Wahhabi-al-Sa’ud Islamic distributive system. AlSa’ud economic corruption ate away at the political
system’s economic institutions established to reward the
Islamic community for its loyalty. Over the past decade,
the al-Sa’ud have invested, overwhelmingly, in the
‘Commodification of Islam’ (S. Baroni, Public Presentation,
Jan 2006). Billions of dollars flow through the,
predominantly al-Sa’ud established, funded, and controlled
‘Islamic’ television, film, radio, publications, clothing,
banking, educational, and food industries. Whether or not
this ‘Commodification of Islam’ has been done for
individual interests or the interests of the Islamic
community as a whole is a question that the al-Sa’ud is
being forced to respond to today.
To counter the al-Sa’ud power apparatus of National
Guard, police, mutawaeen, and Imams, the populations have
developed a highly intricate subversive social system. To
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be discovered participating in this underground social
network is punishable by torture, life imprisonment or
death. However, the underground system struggles to
revitalize Wahhabi ideological foundations and to reform
what remains of the al-Sa’ud/Wahhabi political
institutions.
In March 1992, Saudi Arabia adopted a constitution by
Royal decree of King Fahd, rather than by the Islamic
notion of democratic consensus. Chapter 1 General
Principles Article 1 of the constitution states that “The
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state
with Islam as its religion: God’s Book and the Sunnah of
His Prophet are its constitution.”

This clause notes the

that the al-Sa’ud remains committed to the principles of
Wahhabi/Hanbali Islam and it also protects them against any
possible threat against their rule. By affirming the Arab
aspect of Islam, the al-Sa’ud request its neighbors to
uphold and support its political foundations through their
acceptance of the al-Sa’ud claim that the Kingdom is the
center of both the Arab and Islamic world.
According to the Quran and hadith, or the Prophet’s
traditions on succession, nothing grants any such process,
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as stated in Chapter 2 Article 5 (a) of the new
constitution, that “the system of government in the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia is that of a monarchy” and (b) providing
succession to be “by the sons of the founding King Abd AlAziz bin Abd al-Rahman al Faysal Al Sa’ud and to their
children’s children” (Saudi Arabia Constitution, 1993).

In

Islam, as in the first Caliphate of the Islamic community,
a leader is elected by consensus and pledged loyalty of the
populations. The leader is authorized to rule as long as he
remains in accordance with Islam and is responsible to all.
The al-Sa’ud established a quasi-separation between
political mechanisms and Wahabbi ideology by removing the
religious imams and ulema from Islamic accountability, as
none of the early Islamic caliphs (often referred to as the
Rightly Guided Caliphs) were popularly elected. The first
caliph-Abu Bakr, was recognized on the basis of his age and
closeness to the Prophet; the second was designated by the
first; the third was chosen by a counsel; and the fourth
had the caliphate handed over to him.
According to the 1992 Saudi constitution, the King
appoints all deputies of the prime minister and ministers
and members of the Council of Ministers by Royal decree
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(Article 57) and he also has the right to dissolve and
reorganize the Council of Ministers, presenting further
conflict between the al-Sa’ud and Wahhabi tradition.
According to Islam, the King must listen to his advisors
and take their views into consideration, signifying
consensus. The King and his ministers, who are all royal
family members, do not allow for differences in opinion.
Should an individual disagree with the ruling family, he is
asked to step down, or is imprisoned, tortured or killed.
The abuse of human rights by the ruling al-Sa’ud
increased throughout the 1990s as the separation between
al-Sa’ud and the Wahhabi Ulema widened (Report: Saudi
Arabia, 2005). Al- Sa’ud restrictions placed on the Ulema
resulted in the emergence of more dissenters within their
ranks and the general population (On the Line, 2004). Many
of the Ulema and al-Sa’ud family relationship fractures
emerged after King Fahd expelled Muslims from Saudi Arabia
during and following the Gulf War. This act was one that
may have led to the irreversible downfall of the royal
family. According to Wahhabi Islam, the ‘other’ or the
infidels should never enter the holy land.

Expelling the

Muslims from Saudi Arabia and allowing the U.S. to build a
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base in the Kingdom, were against all principles of the
Wahhabi ideology that the al-Sa’ud authority had depended
on for more than a century for its own legitimacy.
Hastening to quiet the masses in October 1994, King
Fahd announced the establishment of the Supreme Council of
Islamic Affairs to be led by the Minister of Defence Sultan
ibn Abd Al Aziz and another Council for Islamic Call and
Guidance to be led by the Minister of Islamic Affairs
(Kostiner, 1997). The public soon realized the rules and
regulations and appointment of members of the councils was
not by consensus but rather by enforcement and that the
Consultative Council was not the mechanism aimed to
distribute power, as suggested by the King and his deputies
from its inception. The al-Sa’ud’s perception of their loss
of the control brought about by the Islamic contract
initiated by their forebears is demonstrated by their
establishment of these other political institutions under
the name of Islam.
Journalist Bob Woodward’s book, Plan of Attack, and the
ensuing media crisis indicates that the al-Sa’ud is
unlikely to receive support, on which they now depend, from
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the Bush administration in the event of continuing attacks
against the regime (Woodward, 2004).
The April 2004 bombing of the General Security
headquarters in Riyadh was the third terrorist attack in
less than one year. Daily attacks and armed struggles are
occurring between internal Saudi security forces and
civilian groups and individuals fighting against the alSa’ud regime. Some claim that it is al-Qaeda and others
that it is Iran. Yet, al-Qaeda is the Saudi opposition
group based on Wahhabi Islam. The al-Sa’ud rejection of the
Wahhabi system that its authority rested on is no longer
accepted. The Wahhabi driven religious establishment can no
longer act as al-Sa’ud’s mediator because they too have
become the Wahhabi “other”-the same “other” created by the
al-Sa’ud-Wahhabi ideology in the late 18th century to
consolidate and unify the tribes.
Many of the neighbourhood mosques now serve as centers
for popular dissent and meeting grounds for those planning
the next attacks aimed at toppling the ruling family. The
separation of Wahhabi education in normal schools versus
mosques-run madrusahs has historical roots. In early
Islamic periods, Hanbalis preferred to teach in mosques
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away from the eyes of the ruling authority controlled
schools or madrusahs (Leiser, 1981). Therefore, Today’s
government controlled madrusahs or schools are over-crowded
and hosted in dirty, collapsing apartment buildings. The
unchallengeable state curriculum is religion, which is
studied four subjects at a time, and all forms of
creativity are labelled blasphemous and prohibited.
Unemployment is rising rapidly in the Kingdom and has
reached 25% in most areas (Saudi Arabia, 2006). Government
health services are lacking and water is scarce, with
supply often cut off for days at a time. Monitoring and
censoring media has become increasingly difficult for the
government. Citizens specialize in breaking government
computer firewalls, diverting the non-dissident religious
authorities and deceiving or bribing the police. Al-Sa’ud’s
creation of an external enemy to bolster its Wahhabi
legitimacy has backfired; in the resulting rampant hatred
of not only America but of anything that symbolizes America
or Western culture.
Civil disorder and dissidence within Saudi Arabia
demonstrates that the population has little tolerance for
its government, which they believe has turned against its
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own Wahhabi foundations. The al-Sa’ud have broken their
Wahhabi Islamic contract and their rule of the Kingdom is
now in jeopardy. The Wahhabi political system they created
to consolidate the masses under their control now seek to
overthrow them and return the Wahhabi political
institutions including education, economic, and legal
systems to the people.
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CHAPTER FIVE: WAHHABISM AND ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

After examination of the development of Wahhabi
ideology into Wahhabi political systems and the
contemporary al-Sa’ud attempts to separate the same
founding Wahhabi ideology from its institutions, this study
will examine Wahhabism as it compares to other Islamic
political movements. While, fundamentalism also known as
Islamism, emerged with the birth of Islam, Wahhabi
ideology, dating back to the late 18th century, can be said
to have influenced the emergence of several contemporary
Islamic political movements. From 1970-1995, approximately
175 Islamic fundamentalist groups existed throughout the
Arab world (Dekmejian, 223-247). All of the groups identify
themselves as being based on Islam; yet, Nazih Ayubi noted
“Islam means different things to different people...to some
it may mean legitimizing the status quo while for others it
may provide…a spearhead for revolution.” (Karawan, 1992).
The following pages will examine and compare three Islamic
political movements to Wahhabism including the Society of
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the Egyptian Brotherhood, the Jama’at-I Islami or Islamic
Party, and today’s contemporary al-Qaeda.
Islamic political movements, however, often did not
share or found themselves on the Wahhabi version of Islam,
but rather on the Islamic school of jurisprudence practiced
in the particular country from where they initially
emerged. While neither the Egyptian Brotherhood nor the
Jama’at-I Islami provided, like Wahhabism, the ideological
foundation for a religio-political fundamentalist state,
they are still worth examining.
Islamic fundamentalist movements such as the Muslim
Brotherhood Society in Egypt established by Hasan a-Bana in
1929, were founded, and in part thrived on an increasing
intolerance of foreign influence (Brown, 144). As noted in
earlier chapters, Wahhabism too was influenced by an
intolerance of foreign practices i.e. the Shiite worship of
stones or tree worship and animistic belief systems.
Secondly, like Wahhabism, the Egyptian Muslim
brotherhood called for the institutionalization of pure
Islamic law. So, the insistence on Islamic legal systems
and intolerance of foreign elements were predominant

99

factors in both Wahhabism and the Egyptian Brotherhood
movements.
Thirdly, like Wahhabism, the Brotherhood called for a
strict adherence to the Islamic texts-the Quran and the
hadith or traditions of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad. The
group, similar to Wahhabism was well organized with
charismatic leadership (Gourley). Despite the organization
and great appeal that the revivalist movement had, the
group began attacking the Egyptian government. The
assassination of President Sadat by the group only led to
it being impossible for the group to entrench itself
further into Egyptian political institutions.

The drastic

measures taken by the Egyptian Brotherhood to advance their
agenda may have resulted in alienating themselves from some
of the public that had supported them in the first place.
Two observations of comparison must be further
examined.

The Egyptian Brotherhood did not become a

political system with the necessary institutions that exert
social control over the populations.

It did not proclaim

to practice the Hanbali/Wahhabi version of Islam and it
never achieved an advanced economic distribution or
education system. It was successful in pushing Egypt’s
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President Anwar Sadat to agree to the institution of
Islamic law in 1980 as the main source of state
legislation. However, Sadat was assassinated in 1981 when
he attempted to take control of the mosques, the main
religious educational institutions, because the Brotherhood
had managed to swing many toward its political ideology,
threatening the Egyptian government’s survival. The
Egyptian Brotherhood never managed to co-opt the state to
legitimize its activities by allowing its agenda to be
integrated into further political institutions. This could
be partly attributed to the fact that the Egyptian
government did not base its authority on religious
premises.
South Asia’s Jamaat al Islam, founded in 1941 by Sayyid
Abu’l A’la Mawdudi, also began as an Islamic fundamentalist
ideology aimed at eradicating foreign influences on Islamic
practices in South Asia (Gourley). The Jama’at was formed
as a political movement aimed to bring society back into
the realm of strict Islamic ideology.
Mawdudi attempted to cut all political and social ties
to all non-Muslims, while at the same time taking up arms
against them. This appears similar to Wahhabism; however,
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one must not forget that Wahhabism, although promulgating
adherence to a strict Wahhabi form of Islam, was founded
based on collaboration with the legitimate authority, not
in opposition to it. Over two decades and following several
attempts to overthrow the state apparatus, the Jamaat al
Islam also failed.
Yet, both the Egyptian Brotherhood and Jammat al Islam
did not possess the founding components of Wahhabism as a
political system. Wahhabism represented a Muslim ruling
authority, which utilized Wahhabi Islam to derive
legitimization from and control the masses. This was
accomplished by integrating Wahhabi Islamic practices into
the educational, legal, and authoritative institutions.
Neither the Egyptian Brotherhood nor Jama’at-I Islami
demonstrated the Wahhabi ideology which so harshly
separates infidel from Muslim based on practice, loyalty
and adherence to the Wahhabi version of Islam. The Egyptian
Brotherhood was also a nationalist movement, which could
have accounted for some of the diffusion of its potency.
However, it was well respected in the Arab Muslim world as
being the ultimate Islamic political force.
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The Al-Qaeda political movement began at around the
time of the Gulf War. Actually, it was in its
organizational phase prior to the Gulf War, but it was
still comprised of many smaller groups or cells separated
by region, city, village and sometimes mosque. Al-Qaeda
then unified the various groups or cells at the time of the
Gulf War and accomplished this feat with the assistance of
some of the major decisions taken by the al-Sa’ud ruling
family. The al-Sa’ud decision, resulting in the unification
of the Islamic political movements inside Saudi Arabia,
came in August 1990 when the Saudi government allowed the
stationing of Americans, Europeans and other foreign nonIslamic people inside the Kingdom (Karawan, 1992). This act
would not have had such a violent reaction had King Fahd
not kicked Muslims out of the Kingdom at the same time
including large populations of Iranians and Palestinians
who had been working in Saudi Arabia for decades.

In a

shocking turn of events, the ruling al-Sa’ud ordered the
leading Wahhabi Islamic cleric Abd al Aziz Bin Baz in a
shocking television address to authorize and sanction the
King’s actions (Bin Baz, 1990).
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Al-Qaeda members espouse the tenets of Wahhabi Islamic
belief. They practice alienation of all non-Muslims and
Muslims who do not follow their religious predisposition.
The leader of Al-Qaeda is Saudi national Osama bin Laden
(Brennan, Pillar, 2006). Osama is renowned for his speeches
to members of Al-Qaeda around the world. His speeches
provide information about the Al-Qaeda movement, which he
heads.
Whether or not Osama is in Saudi Arabia is irrelevant,
because Osama, without question, speaks Wahhabi rhetoric.
Abdullah Bijan Al-Oteibi, a once time Islamic radical said
that “In a sense, bin Laden is using Wahhabi ideology in
this original revolutionary form against the Saudi state”
(Zakaria, 3). Although he speaks in general terms, in
context, he is addressing in order: 1) Saudi Arabia; 2) the
West; 3) Other Muslim countries; 4) Other Muslim peoples.
There is an order to his address with the first two-Saudi
Arabia and the West, representing the dialectic. This
resonates with Wahhabi ideology examined earlier where the
dialectic comprised those who believe and follow Wahhabi
ideology and those who do not.
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Osama’s latest speech, sent to Al Jazeera television
station on November 1, 2004, is a unique example of some
aspects of Wahhabi ideology.

Many of the patterns

prevalent in this speech resound throughout the Kingdom’s
diverse rhetorical avenues today among Wahhabi adherents.
Osama begins his speech by praising God, “Praise be to
Allah who created the creation for his worship and
commanded them to be just and permitted the wronged one to
retaliate against the oppressor in kind” (Bin Laden).

This

statement informs the audience of several points: first,
that the most important thing in this world is God; second,
that man is less important than God because it was God who
created man; and third, that God created man to worship him
as opposed to anyone or anything else. This statement
resonates with Wahhabi undertones. Wahhabi ideology shuns
the worship of anything or anyone on this earth and love
and worship for only God. Bin Laden is speaking pure
Wahhabi rhetoric.
The statement also represents, in accordance with
Wahhabi ideology, an attack against the United States and
the al-Sa’ud family, because, according to Bin Laden, the
royal family, by their association with America, and in
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particular the Bush family, are also non-believers or
infidels by virtue of that association.
Next, the statement addresses the fact that God
commanded the Muslim or believer to be “just.” These words
symbolize the fact that Osama is most likely addressing
Saudi Arabia.

Osama’s word of God is to the people of

Saudi Arabia, not the world, because the world is comprised
of foreigners and Westerners versus those who are just or
Saudi Muslims.

It is believed that God commanded the Saudi

Muslims (those in the Arabian Peninsula at the time of the
Prophet Mohammad) to lead the world by setting an example
for the rest of the world of what it means to be just.
According to Wahhabism, the religious and just Muslims are
elevated believers.
Next, Osama’s statement orders that if an individual is
oppressed, by those who are unjust or the non-believers,
then he or she has the authority by God to retaliate. The
sentence “permitted the wronged one to retaliate against
the oppressor in kind” means that Osama is addressing the
Wahhabi populations in Saudi Arabia and around the world.
This is a call by Osama bin Laden to war and that war is in
Saudi Arabia. There is no need for justification of
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retaliation against the West because that is a given, and
it is understood that life is a war against the West.
However, Osama is justifying the war and declaring his
sanction of a war against other Muslims or the al-Sa’ud
family.
As noted earlier in Wahhabism, Al-Qaeda effectively
uses God terms on a regular basis, illustrating the
Wahhabi-Hanbali fixation on such terminology. By
associating the creator or God with “just” worshipers, it
is assumed that the wronged one is the just believer and
the oppressor is the unjust non-believer or infidel.

In

Wahhabism it is asserted that non-believers are Western and
that believers or Muslim are Eastern peoples.
The examination and comparison between Al-Qaeda and
Wahhabism demonstrate familiar ideological similarities. To
both, the formula al-Islam din wa-dawla (Islam is the
religion and state) takes precedence (Kramer, 4). However,
one must also examine the political institutions and the
similarities and/or contrasts that exist within them.
Wahhabism had developed its own educational systems through
mosques, and religious schools (Madrosas). Al-Qaeda has
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also developed and maintained an extensive network of
mosques to teach and to enforce Wahhabi beliefs.
Wahhabism was governed by the Islamic authority in
Saudi Arabia-the al-Sa’ud king. Yet, the increase of Saudi
state power at the expense of public political
participation has led to alienation of the masses from
authority (Cudsi & Dessouki, 191). Al-Qaeda is governed by
Osama bin Laden, an Islamic authority as well, but his
whereabouts are not known nor are they provided to the
general populations. However, his prevailing presence on
television and in the media do much the same, if not more
in terms of governance or rule by proxy.
Also, more so than other movements, Al-Qaeda promotes
rule by proxy in that Osama speaks about love for God
alone. Worship for a ruler or legitimate political
authority is not allowed in either Wahhabism or Al-Qaeda.
The governing authority is the true Wahhabi Islamic leader,
at present Osama Bin Laden.
Al-Qaeda, like Wahhabism, also has a complex economic
distributive system (Jones, 2003). Hosting technologically
advanced financial capabilities; the movement distributes
and receives funds from all corners of the earth. Unlike
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Wahhabism, the Al-Qaeda economic system is much faster
moving and much more difficult to unravel (Lederer, 2005).
Al-Qaeda funding travels the world in nano-seconds and
under the guise of many covers.
Finally, the mosques and their congregations, which are
responsible in part for the enforcement of Islamic or
Shariah legal principles, manage many of the operations of
Al-Qaeda, as was the case in Wahhabism. The mosques serve
as a transportable quasi-state reproducing some of the main
political institutions necessary including training and
education, providing authoritarian leadership, economic
distribution, and mechanisms for social control. The AlQaeda mosque is responsible for the community and its
congregation ascribes to its teachings. Subsequently,
congregational members fall within the responsibility of
that mosque and the leader of that institution-the imam.
Members are also subject to the rules and regulations of
the way of life proscribed by that mosque. Religious
identity is channelled to the Al-Qaeda congregations from
the mosque and its leaders, with the focus being on
individual loyalties upon religious values-critical in
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mobilizing members for social, moral, and political action
(Lapidus, 25).
Therefore, it can be said that Al-Qaeda serves as a
transportable form of Wahhabism. Al-Qaeda, like Wahhabism
proscribes to strict adherence to the Quran and Hadith and
the Hadith as interpreted by the Hanbali School of
jurisprudence. Wahhabi and Al-Qaeda ideology are identical.
Wahhabism as a political system with all of the
institutions for social control is also identical to AlQaeda; however, because the Al-Sa’ud struggle today to
dismantle the Wahhabi political system that had sustained
their rule for decades, it has had to transform itself for
survival into Al-Qaeda, a cell like structure that
resembles a transportable political system. Saudi Arabia’s
inability to adapt the puritan theocratic institutional
system with the modern conditions of a state, economy and
society may have forced Wahhabism to temporarily transform
its own institutions.
Today, Wahhabi territory is virtual territory. All
Muslims from around the world pray to Makkah. During prayer
five times a day, they are within that territory, no matter
where their physical beings lay. Al-Qaeda members around
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the world look to Makkah, the ultimate religious
representative within those cells for guidance and
authority and they in return grant that cell legitimization
and the funds for it to survive (Al-Qaeda / Al-Qaeda (the
Base)).
The examination of multiple Islamic political movements
is necessary in order to grasp the similarities and as well
the complexities that exist. Although the Egyptian, South
Asian and Al-Qaeda movements differ greatly from one
another, there are a few similarities that remain including
the separation and alienation of non-Muslims, the call for
an Islamic revival, and the incorporation of marginalized
groups into their congregations. However, Al-Qaeda
demonstrates that what was once considered the Al-Sa’ud
Wahhabi political system is now the very potent and viable
al-Qaeda, transportable, and at times an actual virtual
political system. Just how one can comprehend the
complexities in understanding a transportable political
system and/or communicating with it, is yet to be seen. The
ability to grasp the realities of the current form of
Wahhabism is an opportunity that leads toward a better
understanding of its complexities.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

The study of the evolution of Wahhabism from an
ideology to a political system is one in which there exist
a multitude of theoretical and conceptual definitions that
fall within gray areas. When does an ideology evolve into a
political system and what defines that political system? Do
diverse ideologies evolve into political systems
differently? It is essential to examine a political system
from the inception of the ideology in which it espouses,
drawing patterns and examining relationships. In order to
comprehend the evolution of Wahhabism from an ideology to a
political system, it is imperative that one examine first
the components that comprise Wahhabism as an ideology and
subsequently as a political system.
One of the first questions that requires examination is
why followers of Wahhabism do not recognize the meaning of
the term. Perhaps it is because Wahhabism as an ideology
denies member scrutiny. Yet, only through a close
examination of Wahhabism as an ideology, can one ascertain
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the foundations of this denial. Lack of understanding
amongst its followers can be attributed at least in part by
its non-existence among members.

According to Mullins

definition that ideology “links the cognitive and
evaluative perception of one’s social condition,” perhaps
members’ cognitive and evaluative perceptions of their
social condition is such that the ideology in itself cannot
be comprehended by members within the system (Mullins,
1972). Such a condition then demands outside study and
examination, in particular within the transformations that
Wahhabism presents in contemporary society.
Wahhabism is fluid within contemporary dynamic
political systems and rapidly changing international
relations, but, as a political system, it continues to
expand at a global level, giving rise to a new form of
contemporary terrorism as demonstrated in the comparison of
Al-Qaeda and Wahhabism. However, can we call this form of
terrorism a political system?
Al-Qaeda possesses authoritative leadership through
Osama Bin Laden, along with innumerous religious
authorities or Imams at community mosques around the world;
its territory is virtual or the house of God symbolized by
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Makkah; it controls a global economic distributive system;
encompasses a complete legal system governing a member’s
way of life; and has the ability to enforce that
legislation. It’s authority is unquestionable and members
form an elite community that almost resembles a tight knit
family unit, with members numbering in the thousands.
Careful examination of Wahhabism as an ideology has to
take into consideration the context within which it
emerged. In an economically stricken, tribal, segmented
society where class is cause for survival, religious
studies dominated the disenfranchised and the marginalized
poor populations (Al-Ghafur, 1964).
Along with Mohammed Abd al-Wahhab’s new Wahhabi
ideology came the solidification of a class system based on
religious practices. Those who ascribed to Abd al-Wahhab’s
religious orientation belonged to his elite community of
pure Muslims versus all others who did not-the infidel
versus the Muslim. It did not matter if the infidel was a
Muslim or not. What mattered was whether they demonstrated
through practice, their belief in the tenets of Wahhabism
(Mortimer, 62).
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Wahhabi ideology was not extraordinary in that it
included the basic teachings of Islam and the traditions of
the Islamic Prophet Mohammed, but it was very different
from other Islamic ideologies. Wahhabism emphasized
particular Islamic practices above others and that emphasis
was greatly responsible for the new form of Wahhabism we
see today in Al-Qaeda.
Wahhabi ideology was resilient, triumphant, and not
surprisingly, outlasted numerous regime changes in the
Arabian Desert (Esposito, 2002). The Al-Sa’ud Abd Al-Wahhab
alliance solidified the governing institution necessary to
create a political system. Immediately uniting the tribes,
collecting tax revenues, and proliferating the new ideology
in the local training centers, the mosques, so too were the
social institutions and economic system established whose
foundation rested on Wahhabism as an ideology.
As Wahhabism grew and foreign lands were conquered, a
form of rule by proxy developed whereby local authoritarian
leaders governed their communities according to Wahhabism;
however, the ultimate guidance came from the house of God
or Makkah, Saudi Arabia (Mortel, 1987).

And that house of

God at Makkah was governed by the Custodian or Guardian of
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Islam-the Saudi King. Makkah belonged to the Muslim masses,
no matter how remote they may be and it was Makkah that
dictated the legal system that all Wahhabi adherents
recognized and obeyed.
The Al-Sa’ud was successful in positioning its
governance as the unquestionable ruler of the Islamic
community. Today, to question the Al-Sa’ud is tantamount to
questioning Islam and traitors, otherwise known as
apostates are executed (Three Saudis executed by beheading,
2005). Recent bombings inside Saudi Arabia and attacks
against the Al-Sa’ud and its interests came from the
Wahhabi followers that it created. The al-Sa’ud’s
increasingly visible Commodification of Islam as well as
other anti-Wahhabi tendencies has incited the Kingdom’s
religious populations against it.
After the 1979 takeover of the grand mosque at Makkah,
the al-Sa’ud marketed its religious position to the masses
focusing on the Wahhabi ideology of infidel versus Muslim,
East versus West, and in creating external enemies that
Wahhabism could attack (Kechichian, 1986) (Kostiner, 1992).
However, this diversion did not prevent the public from
acknowledging that large class differences existed,
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especially when religious men or Imams and ulema were
imprisoned and Muslims were kicked out of the holy land in
1990 and foreign peoples brought in to guard the holiest
sites in Islam following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq
(Saudi Arabia Country Profile, 2002).
These actions constituted a public demonstration by the
al-Sa’ud against the Wahhabi ideology. That, along with the
continuing al-Saud Commodification of Islam, have led to a
Wahhabi revolt inside the Kingdom. The Al-Sa’ud, in an
attempt to arrest the growing number of Wahhabis who dared
question their governance, began modifying the Wahhabi
institutions that it had established decades ago
(Stalinsky, 2003)(Al-Shamery, 2006). This unraveling of
some of the key components of Wahhabism forced those who
adhere to the ideology’s beliefs and practices to move
underground. Many Wahhabi adherents fled Saudi Arabia and
established new Wahhabi communities outside the country.
Others deep inside the Kingdom run theirs in the virtual
world, fleeing from the watchful eyes of the authorities
(Teitelbaum). A communiqué, issued by al-Qaeda in Saudi
Arabia called for revenge against the al-Saud for arresting
40 citizens for “abetting terrorist activity in the state
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and their impact on the Jihadist Internet community” (A
Message from al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia Concerning the Arrest
of Forty Suspects and the al-Hesbah Network, 2006).
The examination of other political movements reveals
that many of the movements did not have the chance to
establish and form political institutions. Lacking these,
both movements nearly collapsed and were not successful in
establishing their hold. Al-Qaeda, however, demonstrated
striking similarities to Wahhabism. Its economic
distributive system was one owned and run by the people;
the authority remained within the virtual territory of the
house of God; its social reproduction and training centers
remained the mosques. Yet, the mosques in Al-Qaeda were
forced to take on greater responsibilities as the Islamic
community began functioning as a separate political system
inside another’s territory.

How these two systems will

interact with one another is a question that has yet to be
answered. Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah, in his first
appearance before his consultative counsel stated that he
will continue on to reform the Kingdom’s economic and
political system irrespective of any objectives of takfir
from its religious populations.
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This study has examined Wahhabi political ideology as
social values which exist beneath and underlie the
relationship between those who hold power and those who are
controlled by that power (Loewenstein, 1953). However, if
the Wahhabi ideology was invoked by the al-Sa’ud, forming
the basis for a relationship between the al-Sa’ud and Saudi
Arabia’s diverse populations, can the ideology be
dismantled beneath the political system without a collapse
of that system and its corresponding institutions? Crown
Prince Sultan, deputy premier and minister of defense and
aviation made a public statement April 4, 2006, “I can
assure you and everyone else that the ruling family is
united in one hand and one heart” (Qusti, 2006). Yet, the
question is not if they have one heart or two or if they
are united, but if the ground they stand on is strong
enough to bear their weight.
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